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REPORT
Managing ThE 
sOcial Risks Of 
Public sPEnding 
cuTs in scOTland
Darinka Asenova, Stephen J. Bailey and Claire McCann
This report identifies current practice in five 
anonymous Scottish local government case studies 
in their approaches to implementing austerity 
measures and considers the extent to which they 
recognise and seek to manage the resulting social 
risks to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. 
The report focuses on:
•	 Identifying and measuring the potential and actual impact of budget cuts.
•	 Drawing instructive comparisons with the approaches of other public and 
para-public sector bodies.
•	 Identifying criteria, frameworks and priority-setting processes that are, or 
could be, used when deciding cuts and reconfiguration.
•	 Determining whether risk implications for disadvantaged groups are 
sufficiently recognised by policy-makers.
•	 Assessing if and how the totality of public services needs of high-
risk groups are addressed and whether community stakeholders are 
sufficiently involved and empowered.
•	 Identifying existing and innovative financing methods for capital projects 
and service delivery.
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The ongoing budget cuts being imposed by the UK Government over its 
four years of office have already led to a significant reduction of overall 
public spending. Such reductions pose considerable challenges to resource 
allocation within diminished budgets of many public sector organisations, 
especially local authorities. The Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure 
is being used by all five councils as a proxy risk mitigation tool for managing 
social risk in protecting disadvantaged and vulnerable communities when 
deciding cuts to budgets, and reconfiguration of services in the first year 
of budget cuts from 2011–12. Yet, case studies demonstrate that EIAs are 
unsuitable as a risk mitigation tool. EIAs fail on at least three counts. First, 
they do not entail or require specific risk mitigation models and so are poor 
as a guide for managing budget cuts. Second, some at-risk socioeconomic 
groups fall outside their scope. Third, the process is driven by compliance 
with existing statutory requirements arising from equalities legislation rather 
than being ‘needs based’. Therefore, the apparent security for disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups provided by the EIA process is illusory and the wider 
socio-economic risk issues and impacts of the austerity measures are not 
explicitly considered.
There was no evidence of the development of ‘bespoke’ risk mitigation 
decision-making models or criteria. Yet case studies suggest that, combined 
with service reconfiguration, the focus on immediate cost savings will 
increase inequality among the most vulnerable communities. The case study 
local authorities have complied with their statutory duties when making 
cuts and so discretionary services are being subject to disproportionately 
large reductions in spending. This compliance-driven approach adopted 
by the case study authorities misses the interconnectivity of service needs 
and social risks, creating institutional barriers to collective actions. It is of 
utmost importance that the case study local authorities develop other 
existing frameworks to mitigate risks to the full range of disadvantaged 
and vulnerable socioeconomic groups, not just those with EIA-protected 
characteristics. Existing frameworks include stakeholder and community 
engagement, knowledge exchange, networking and sharing of experiences 
with other local authorities.
Case study local authorities need to be more innovative and develop 
new, or enhance existing, criteria to meet the needs of disadvantaged and 
vulnerable service users through a bespoke risk mitigation tool tailored to 
the local context in moving from a ‘service-based’ to ‘needs-based’ approach 
in decision-making and risk mitigation. The results of the five Scottish case 
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studies suggest that there is still a long way to go if social risk mitigation and 
the consideration of social impact is to be embedded within their decision-
making processes and that much more progress needs to be made much 
faster in this respect.
assessing and addressing the impact of the uk spending 
cuts
At this stage it is not possible to assess the actual impact of the UK spending 
cuts on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. The impact will not become 
entirely clear for a number of years as cuts take hold. Nevertheless, 
we have found evidence that local authorities may exacerbate current 
inequalities across disadvantaged communities in their actions to reconfigure 
public services as a result of UK budget cuts. Our analysis focuses on 
establishing existing awareness of the cuts, planning, the initial decision-
making frameworks and mitigation measures. The apparent inability of the 
five Scottish local authorities to assess the actual impact of the cuts on 
disadvantaged communities is a cause for concern with regard to social risk 
mitigation. While this can be attributed to the early stages of service reform 
it is also in part to do with limited data collection processes, both past and 
present. The existence of data and information gaps relating to several 
equalities strands makes it difficult to source official statistics or data to assist 
in compiling evidence of need for particular services. The availability of more 
robust, more relevant and more comprehensive official data would greatly 
help the case study local authorities to provide the evidence of need for 
services.
service reconfiguration
Undoubtedly Scottish local authorities will experience an increase in demand 
for services due to increased social risks as a direct consequence of the 
austerity measures. The case study local authorities already experience 
increased social risks such as increased prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse, 
deteriorating domestic situations, and increased unemployment and debt, 
all as a direct result of the austerity measures. Simultaneously, with budgets 
being reduced local authorities are entering a period whereby not only must 
they deal with previously existing vulnerability and disadvantage but also 
with additional vulnerability and disadvantage created by the spending cuts 
and the UK welfare reform. This presents a much bigger challenge in service 
reform across the three stages of efficiency savings, service reconfiguration 
and increased revenue from charging. At this stage the case study local 
authorities have not withdrawn any core services, but as budgets are reduced 
further in 2013–14 and beyond this may have to change. Evidence suggests 
that the case study local authorities are considering joined-up working 
with other organisations, service reduction and service transfer in service 
reconfiguration.
Recognition of risk implications by policymakers and 
practitioners
Risk implications for vulnerable and disadvantaged communities are not 
sufficiently recognised in their entirety by policy-makers and this inhibits 
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risk mitigation. The lack of focus on long-term strategies in the case 
study authorities can be expected to result in the exacerbation of current 
inequalities by failing to mitigate the risks faced by their disadvantaged 
communities in the long term. The challenge for local authorities in dealing 
with austerity measures is in meeting the short-term ‘reactive’ objectives 
(such as crisis intervention and intensive support) alongside investment in 
longer-term ‘proactive’ future proofing of services received by disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups. In principle, a clear UK Government early intervention 
policy direction exists to reduce the impact on services in the longer term: 
councils’ health improvement strategy for example. However, in reality 
local authorities are finding it difficult to focus on preventive measures. 
The reduction of key supporting services which tend to be discretionary 
will almost certainly lead to higher financial and social costs in the longer 
term for local authorities. The challenge is in meeting the ‘here and now’ 
while focusing on longer-term strategies in order to avoid exacerbation of 
current inequalities which will ultimately result in increased social, financial 
and economic costs. Case study local authorities have complied with their 
statutory duties when making cuts and so discretionary services are being 
subject to disproportionate reductions in spending. This approach results 
in the loss of preventive services, and so in the long term both social and 
economic costs may be higher than they would otherwise have been with 
those preventive services still in place.
identification of criteria, frameworks and priority-setting 
processes
The use of the EIA framework as a proxy for managing social risk creates 
a concern that groups on the margins of poverty and disadvantage are at 
most risk of slipping through the net as they are not protected by equalities 
legislation encapsulated in the EIA framework. Central government has given 
councils statutory responsibility for EIAs without ensuring that they have 
(or will soon acquire) the requisite data, processes and skills to undertake 
those assessments. The EIA process was developed prior to the economic 
and financial crisis and as such is not specifically designed to deal with issues 
arising from the spending cuts. Therefore, even if undertaken fully and 
augmented as far as possible to guide decision-making to deal with austerity, 
EIAs remain inadequate and unsuitable for such purposes. The end result is 
that those vulnerable and disadvantaged groups not protected by equalities 
legislation will face further increased inequality if not adequately accounted 
for as part of deliberate decision-making.
The Single Outcome Agreement (SOA) does not reflect the changing 
priorities of case study local authorities in response to the austerity measures 
and so needs to be redetermined if it is to guide councils’ responses to 
austerity. In particular, reduced budgets make it increasingly difficult for the 
councils to focus on preventive measures and early intervention through 
discretionary services whose effectiveness is difficult to assess and therefore 
to protect from cuts. Therefore, notwithstanding the SOA, it is these services 
where major changes are occurring as a result of budget reductions as 
councils focus on the protection of statutory services.
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approaches of other public sector organisations
Facing cuts to budgets, Scottish universities, NHS Scotland and police 
authorities are investigating ways to achieve cost savings. Similar to local 
authorities, they have engaged in an internal reorganisation by reducing staff 
numbers through voluntary redundancies and are experiencing the public 
sector wage freeze. Other initiatives include considering the outsourcing and 
development of strategic relationships with the private and voluntary sectors 
to deliver services, resulting in shared services and streamlining internal 
processes. Changes to other public sector organisations can have an impact 
on the objectives of Scottish local authorities in dealing with the austerity 
measures. For example, NHS changes to social care and health services 
for older people can affect service delivery within a local authority thereby 
promoting the need for increased joined-up working. To truly consider the 
totality of public services, local authorities need to work closely with other 
service organisations.
Totality of public services
Consideration of the totality of public services has gained momentum as a 
result of the UK austerity measures. Local authorities are more conscious of 
aligning priorities, of collective public service delivery integrated across two 
or more providers. However, the compliance-driven approach adopted by 
the case study authorities misses the interconnectivity of service needs and 
social risks, creating institutional barriers to collective actions.
community engagement and empowerment
All five local authorities practise certain elements of stakeholder community 
engagement. However, the extent to which communities’ views are then 
considered as part of the decision-making process is unknown at this stage. 
Although there was evidence of the retraction of certain proposals due to 
their unpopularity among voters, this may only indicate that community 
groups have limited and rather reactive powers of veto, as distinct from being 
proactively and fully engaged and empowered in risk mitigation decision-
making processes. Evidence demonstrating community empowerment is 
therefore limited.
future risk mitigation practice
We have identified a lack of mechanisms for considering disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups as services are cutback, perhaps exacerbated by a lack of 
political will or conflicting local priorities. To complement existing processes 
we propose the development of a prototype decision-making framework 
that assesses the potentially adverse social impacts of service reconfiguration 
in conditions of austerity. Drawing on best risk mitigation practice from local 
authority case studies, this ‘social risk impact assessment’ (SRIA) model of 
decision-making will complement the existing EIA and other assessments 
while encompassing those groups that fall outside the boundaries of specific 
and statutory equality and poverty criteria. The results of this research 
clearly identify the need for social risk mitigation to be embedded within the 
decision-making processes and make clear that much more progress needs 
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to be made much faster in order to address this glaring deficiency. It behoves 
each local authority to develop an SRIA procedure by acting in concert with 
their local stakeholder groups, with the voluntary sector, with other public 
sector organisations and with national and regional governments to inform 
their decision-making in order to avoid unnecessarily high social risks (and 
consequently higher future costs to the public sector) arising from the scale, 
speed and aggregation of their austerity measures.
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1 backgROund TO 
ThE sTudY
The reduction of funding for local authorities in scotland
In Scotland, public sector cuts were delayed by one year as the Scottish 
Government’s 2010/11 budget had already been set prior to election 
of the UK Coalition Government and its 2010 emergency budget. Cuts 
to the Scottish budget in 2011/12 via operation of the Barnett formula 
(see Appendix 2) and beyond will create real challenges for Scottish local 
authorities to find additional cost savings as Scotland ‘catches up’ with the 
austerity in the rest of the UK. The Scottish public sector is facing the:
most dramatic reduction in public spending ever imposed on Scotland 
by the UK Government. In 2011–12, we have already been forced 
to reduce public spending by £1.3 billion, with a 22.9 per cent 
cash reduction to our capital budget. Under the plans that the UK 
Government announced in its October 2010 Spending Review, 
between 2010–11 and 2014–15, we face real terms resource budget 
reductions of 9.2 per cent and a real terms cut to our capital budget of 
36.7 per cent.
(Scottish Government, 2011, page iv)
However, there is increasing scepticism that the UK Coalition Government 
will be able to meet its (already reduced) target debt reduction by 2015–16 
(Bell, 2011). The UK Welfare Reform agenda will undoubtedly have a 
negative impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, but it is not a 
devolved issue and Scottish local authorities have little or no control over its 
negative impacts.
Clearly, prolonged public sector austerity may have considerable cost 
implications in the longer term for unemployment and for the provision 
of public services such as health, social care and education. However, this 
situation may ultimately be much worse than appears at first glance. Most 
attention focuses on the speed and scale of public service cuts, but, as made 
clear above, it is the aggregation of those cuts that has the potential to cause 
the most severe adverse effects because it creates a vicious circle of self-
reinforcing social risks. In colloquial terms, a ‘multiple whammy’ effect may 
occur whereby specific individuals fall into multiple disadvantaged groups 
and where there is a risk that cuts in one area of public services have the 
potential to exacerbate their vulnerability to cuts in other public services.
09background to the study
Given their considerable public services role and their highly developed 
interaction with the local communities that are most adversely affected by 
public sector austerity, local authorities are best placed to mitigate the risk 
of adverse effects on disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and to minimise 
the potential for exacerbation of social inequalities and social exclusion. 
Nevertheless, local authorities themselves face considerable financial and 
organisational risks in attempting to manage the cuts in the funding they 
receive from the Scottish Government.
Central government grants (including Council Tax Benefit subsidy) 
accounted for 62 per cent of Scottish local authorities’ revenue income (see 
Appendix 1) in 2010–11, the other 38 per cent being own-source revenue 
income. The components of own-source revenue income and their shares 
of total income were as follows: 12 per cent came from fees and charges 
including rents, 11 per cent from non-domestic (i.e. business) property 
tax, 11 per cent from council tax (excluding Council Tax Benefit subsidy), 
the remaining 4 per cent being ‘other income’ including that from interest 
on cash balances. Their revenue funding from the Scottish Government 
is planned to be cut by 6.7 per cent in real terms between 2011–12 and 
2014–15 (Scottish Government, 2011, Table 16.02, p. 230).
If councils were to seek to offset their losses of grants by increasing their 
rates of council tax and/or levels of charges (see pages 26–27 for examples) 
both these own-source revenues would have to be increased much more in 
percentage terms than the percentage loss of grant for which they would be 
trying to make up. This high level of gearing (see Appendix 1) makes it very 
difficult for Scottish councils to manage austerity other than by means of 
immediate reductions in their expenditures on employee and operating costs 
commensurate with the speed and scale of cuts in their grants.
The gearing ratio, and its corresponding financial constraint, is greatest 
for those authorities with relatively high expenditure need per head of 
population, relatively low taxable resources per capita and relatively high 
service costs (e.g. due to sparsity of population) because they receive 
proportionately higher levels of grants from the Scottish Government. 
Hence, councils with relatively high proportions of disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups face the highest gearing ratios and so are much less able 
to mitigate the austerity-induced social risks faced by those groups than 
more affluent/low-need local governments.
In fact, Scottish councils’ heavy dependence on grants from the Scottish 
Government has been exacerbated by the freezing of council tax over the 
last five years (see Appendix 1) and by the Scottish Government making 
key public services free to users, including some provided by councils (see 
Appendix 3). The council tax freeze also resulted in Scotland receiving less 
Council Tax Benefit subsidy from the UK Government than would otherwise 
have been the case (see Appendix 1). Hence, Scottish councils face even 
more restricted local finances than elsewhere in the UK.
Service charges are the only immediately available local source of 
additional finance. Notwithstanding the high rate of gearing between 
increases in total spending and the income they would have to raise, charges 
could be used together with vouchers based on both need for services and 
ability to pay for them so as to mitigate austerity-induced social risks (see 
Appendix 3). Their potential for risk mitigation is a key aspect of Best Value.
The universal nature of free services such as personal care of older 
people does little or nothing to mitigate the social risks of austerity and may 
even increase them by diverting scarce funds from services of particular 
benefit to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. This is especially likely to 
be the case if making services free was not properly costed, as claimed by 
10Managing the social risks of public spending cuts in Scotland
Scottish councils. Besides leading to increased demand and so even more 
financial pressures on councils, the financial implications of abolition of 
charges in Scotland but not in England are not allowed for in the Scottish 
Government’s block grant paid by the Westminster government because 
Scottish spending decisions are not funded via the Barnett formula (see 
Appendix 2). The result is that there is less financial flexibility for the Scottish 
public finances to be used to mitigate the social risks faced by disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups as a result of the UK austerity measures.
The groups benefiting disproportionately from the Scottish Government 
freezing council tax and making services free were not vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups because they already received Council Tax Benefit and 
their use of these free services is disproportionately low (i.e. universities) 
or they already received financial support (i.e. personal care). The picture 
for free bus travel is more mixed; people aged 60 and over qualify 
notwithstanding the fact that many are still in employment (and so can travel 
to work by bus for free) and by no means all pensioners are poor (e.g. those 
with occupational pensions).
conceptualising social risk
Over the last decade or so, the term ‘social risk’ has been used to describe a 
new category of risks associated with the creation of further socioeconomic 
disadvantage, poverty and/or marginalisation of groups and individuals. This 
term was introduced and developed in a series of documents produced by 
the World Bank during the late 1990s and early 2000s as a part of their 
new policy approach for social protection focusing predominantly, but not 
exclusively, on developing countries. This innovative approach was designed 
to make development programmes more effective in alleviating the negative 
effects of the global financial crisis (from the late 1990s) and represents an 
attempt to develop an alternative social protection strategy based around 
risk management principles. It reflects an important shift in social protection 
policies towards the use of risk management in a social context, rather 
than in a business/organisational context as a tool for reducing economic 
vulnerability (McKinnon, 2004). In that way, the proactive management of 
social risks to ameliorate vulnerability and reduce exposure of  populations 
to them by means of socioeconomic development programmes was a 
socially strategic response to the ‘trade not aid’ plea of developing countries 
intended to achieve both economic and social inclusion benefits.
This approach shifted the strategic focus of the World Bank from the 
previously endorsed coping strategies to more proactive, ex-ante planning 
strategies. By and large, the World Bank’s reports make two important 
assumptions. First, that vulnerability is associated with income poverty, and 
second, that people living in poverty have more limited instruments to deal 
with all possible risk events (Holzman et al., 2003). The ex-ante measures 
for fighting poverty and improving welfare will hopefully also lead to reduced 
costs of ex-post alleviation measures if and when individuals eventually have 
to rely on welfare support (Holzman and Jorgensen, 1999). More recently, 
it has been recognised that social disadvantage affects wider societal groups, 
not only those in poverty. A recent report by published by Demos identified 
seven criteria for disadvantage, namely low income, worklessness, lack of 
educational qualifications, overcrowding, ill-health, mental health problems 
and poor neighbourhood (Bazalgette et al., 2012, p. 11).
More generally, a range of risk factors can affect households and 
individuals (Siegal and Alwang, 1999), such as:
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•	 Production risk due to natural hazards and human decisions (e.g. industrial 
pollution events)
•	 Price risk due to market fluctuations (e.g. of food crops)
•	 Production and market risk related to resource availability (e.g. fuel)
•	 Health risk which, in turn, affects productivity (e.g. increased levels of 
heart disease/cancer)
•	 Policy- and institutions-related risk (e.g. opening domestic markets to 
global competition)
•	 Political risk, including political instability and/or conflict (e.g. a shift in 
political administration)
•	 Social risk associated with social ties and networks (e.g. those lacking 
social and economic resilience because of their diminishing capacity to 
deal with socioeconomic risks)
While the risks to individuals and households can be perceived as private or 
individual, the measures required to mitigate those risks tend to be social and 
public in nature.
social risk management
Social risk management (SRM) has been defined as ‘… public measures 
intended to assist households manage risk and uncertainty in order to reduce 
vulnerability, improve income and consumption smoothing, and contribute to 
economic development (Siegal and Alwang, 1999, p. 2).
This definition of SRM obviously incorporates management (or 
mitigation) of the range of risks (mentioned above) that can affect individuals’ 
livelihoods, so making them less susceptible to welfare loss. Therefore a 
broad interpretation of social risk relates to any factor with the potential to 
lead to welfare loss, such risks being particularly acute for vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups.
This complex nature of social risks is implicitly acknowledged by Holzman 
and Jorgensen (2000, p. 3) in their definition for SRM:
The main idea behind SRM is that all individuals, households and 
communities are vulnerable to multiple risks from different sources, 
whether they are natural (such as earthquakes, flooding and illness) or 
man-made (such as unemployment, environmental degradation and 
war). These shocks hit individuals, communities, and regions mostly in 
an unpredictable manner or cannot be prevented, and therefore, they 
cause and deepen poverty.
Draxler (2006) noted that the purpose of social protection is the public 
management of social risks. In his analysis, social risk is a category which 
includes demographic risks (reduced capability due to old age) or socially 
stratified risks (unemployment or low-paid employment). The author 
highlighted two main factors leading to the metamorphosis of individual 
risks into social risks. The first is the aggregation effect when large numbers 
of people are affected in a similar negative way and the resulting spatial 
spread of deprivation magnifies social disadvantage and vulnerability to 
adversity. The second is the more complex nature of the socioeconomic 
relationships, which weakens the personal ties and networks that could have 
been used for risk mitigation. This may occur, for example, as a result of 
increasingly unstable family and neighbourhood relationships simultaneously 
with increasing mental and physical ill-health that may be associated with 
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long-term unemployment and feelings of social exclusion, with interlinkages 
between these characteristics exacerbating the resulting social risks.
Young (1996) discussed the distinction between public sector and private 
sector risk management, emphasising some key characteristics of public 
sector risks which are typically associated with matters of public interest 
and high levels of uncertainty. Unlike private risks, public risks cannot be 
transferred to responsible parties with ability to bear those risks: the public 
sector must bear and proactively manage those risks. Young further divided 
public risks into organisational and social and noted that while public 
organisations have responsibility for social risks, the traditional approach to 
risk management ‘skims the surface and fails to attack risk comprehensively’ 
(1996, p. 14). This distinction between organisational and social risks is 
evident in the results of the five Scottish council case study research findings 
reported below, the emphasis of those five councils being on minimising risks 
to services as distinct from service users. However, a comprehensive public 
sector approach to social risk requires its mitigation through preventive 
measures.
strategic and systemic social risks
Due to their complex origins and far-reaching impacts social risks are 
sources of strategic risk and also contain significant elements of systemic 
risks affecting a whole population (Hood and Miller, 2009). Following 
the 2007–09 banking crisis in major developed countries, the ensuing 
prolonged recession worsened public sector fiscal imbalances which were 
further exacerbated as a result of governments bailing out major domestic 
and global banks on the verge of bankruptcy. The required consolidation of 
the public finances is focusing disproportionately on cuts in public spending 
and this has led to social risks being recognised as an increasingly salient 
phenomenon that should be urgently and comprehensively addressed 
because of their potentially severe adverse impacts on the human rights and 
equalities agendas. These impacts may occur as a consequence not only of 
reduced access to services on which vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are 
disproportionately dependent but also because the public sector is a major 
employer. ONS data for the second quarter of 2012 reveals that 24.0 per 
cent of jobs in Scotland are in the public sector. It is also a major employer 
of women and other equalities groups and so job cuts will disproportionately 
affect them (ONS, 2012).
Hence, these agendas are a key aspect of public services austerity and are 
additional to the risks that organisations face in the private sector. However, 
the potentially enormous impacts of many of these strategic and systemic 
social risks will not become apparent immediately. For example, the adverse 
social impacts of higher unemployment are most strongly associated with 
long-term (especially youth) unemployment and include a ‘social malaise’ in 
depressed areas leading to a decrease in educational attainment, reduced 
health and wellbeing, increased alcohol and drug abuse, increased criminal 
activity and so on, in the longer term (Phua, 2011). A short-term focus on 
immediate cost-savings may therefore ultimately lead to higher costs if cuts 
exacerbate social inequality and social exclusion.
The very considerable speed, scale and aggregation of public service cuts 
being brought about by the UK Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government combine with the enduring stagnant economy displaying little 
or no growth to create considerable social risks. For example, as business 
failures and the number of jobless increase, alongside reforms to the social 
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security benefits system, the outcome will most likely be increased social 
risks such as poverty, homelessness and housing problems, higher rates of 
alcoholism and drug abuse, domestic violence and suicides (Phua, 2011). 
There also seems likely to be a simultaneous change in the patterns of health 
risk as the economic condition worsens. Certain disadvantaged groups are 
already high-risk groups in society and in worsening economic conditions the 
risks affecting them tend to multiply (Phua, 2011). There may be an increase 
in those requiring access to specific health and social services but access may 
decrease as services are reduced or withdrawn completely. It should also 
be recognised that an increased demand on public services will be further 
complicated from developments in technology, a shift in demographics, 
changes to working patterns, cultural change and higher levels of ‘in work’ 
poverty. The contextual environment within which local authorities make 
tough budget decisions is becoming increasingly challenging.
social risk and public services
Evidently, Scotland’s public services are in need of critical and sustained 
reform to meet unprecedented challenges arising from reduced budgets. 
New demographic and social pressures will entail a huge increase in the 
demand for public services and the economic downturn will intensify and 
prolong demand (McCormick and Harrop, 2011; Public Services Commission, 
2011). Public service reform, i.e. service withdrawal, reduction, transfer and 
joined-up working to achieve improved cost reductions, has the potential to 
negatively affect the quality of service provision delivered by Scottish local 
authorities. The public service system is often fragmented and complex, 
hampering joint working between organisations. As a whole, the system is 
‘top down’ and unresponsive to the needs of individuals and communities 
(Public Services Commission, 2011).
The Christie Report (Public Services Commission, 2011) suggests that 
addressing these systemic defects will require a fundamental overhaul of 
the relationships within and between those institutions and agencies – 
public, third and private sectors – responsible for designing and delivering 
public services. Unless Scottish local government embraces a radical, new, 
collaborative culture throughout their public services, both budgets and 
provision will buckle under the strain (Public Services Commission, 2011). 
Despite a series of Scottish Government initiatives and significant growth in 
public spending since devolution, on most key measures social and economic 
inequalities have remained unchanged or become more pronounced (Public 
Services Commission, 2011; Bazalgette et al., 2012). These inequalities 
account for a significant element of the increasing demands on public service 
provision (Public Services Commission, 2011; Bazalgette et al., 2012).
Particular concerns have been expressed regarding the impact that this 
will have on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups such as young people, 
people with disabilities and/or long-term illness, women, homeless people, 
older people, single parents and minority ethnic groups. Recent research 
(Hasting et al., 2012) found that specific services have been targeted, and 
there is evidence of significant cuts across an extensive range of services 
used by all income groups: low, middle and high. However, there is also 
evidence that some services used more heavily by higher income groups are 
being significantly reduced. Nevertheless, the impact of service reductions 
will fall more heavily on disadvantaged people because of their greater 
reliance on the broad range of public services, compared with more affluent 
households who have the capacity to supplement public with other forms 
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of service provision. The report (Hasting et al., 2012) demonstrated that 
only half of the sample of English local authorities had adopted ‘protecting 
the needs of the most vulnerable clients or communities’ as a principle 
guiding budgetary decision-making and only two of the 25 suggested that 
‘protecting deprived neighbourhoods’ was a key priority.
If similarities exist in the approach of Scottish local authorities to public 
service reform, there is a risk that public service reform will deepen and 
widen existing inequalities if vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are not 
specifically considered in resource allocation (Scotsman, 2011). Recent 
research (Demos, 2010; Fawcett Society, 2011; McCormick and Harrop, 
2011) detects early signs of women, children, young people and people with 
disabilities being disproportionately affected by the austerity measures. For 
example, almost a third (30%) of Women’s Aid groups reported having to 
make changes to the services they provide as a result of reduced funding. 
Such changes focused on stretching reduced resources to cover existing 
services and have resulted in service reduction, for example in contact 
support hours for women, the introduction of waiting lists for referrals and a 
reduction in advocacy support (Scottish Women’s Aid, 2012).
A recent report by the TUC found that support services more susceptible 
to cuts or change are used mainly by women. These include home-based 
care, older people’s care and respite care, childcare, debt advice, fuel 
poverty and housing (TUC, 2011). Cuts in these sectors will adversely affect 
women’s employment especially if part-time and temporary posts are cut in 
preference to full-time permanent posts (EBAG, 2010). Disabled people are 
reliant on a whole range of different local authority and third sector provided 
services and support systems to enable them to maintain a decent quality 
of life, employment and friendship networks, and to living independently 
(Demos, 2010). Cuts to social care services, for example (community and 
personal care), as the largest single service that disabled people are likely 
to use to enable them to live independently will have an impact on quality 
of life (Demos, 2010). Despite the UK Government report (Morrell et al., 
2011) linking closures of youth clubs to the UK riots, these services are 
not protected from the cuts, neither are budgets ring-fenced. Since the 
introduction of the austerity measures in 2010, significant cuts have been 
made across youth services in England (Guardian, 2011). According to 
Hasting et al., (2012) a broad range of children’s services appeared to have 
been badly hit across a number of authorities. Indeed, children and young 
people emerge as the group most severely affected.
An efficiency drive has reduced staff numbers significantly in the public 
sector and as such is a key source of unemployment in Scotland. For 
example, in the UK more than 30,000 NHS workers and 71,000 in education 
were among more than a quarter of a million public sector staff who lost 
their jobs in 2011 (Guardian, 2012). Unemployment among young people 
increased faster than other age groups during the recession (BBC, 2012). 
Young people fare worse in the labour market, with the unemployment rate 
for 16–24 year olds three times that of their adult peers (McCormick and 
Harrop, 2011). The expenditure needed to continue protective initiatives, 
largely in staff time, will be in competition with other demands in times 
of austerity (McCormick and Harrop, 2011). It is becoming increasingly 
important to sustain the ‘protective factors’ often delivered by local 
authorities, such as financial capability training, skills training, confidence 
raising, and widening access to opportunity to support young people in 
the current economic climate. A disproportionate impact of a reduction 
in protective initiatives will undoubtedly increase inequality across societal 
groups at risk. Due consideration must be given to such groups in decision-
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making and social risk-mitigation procedures by Scottish local authorities in 
resource allocation.
social risks and local public finance in scotland
These emerging social and organisational risks create new challenges and 
shape a new risk landscape which requires an innovative public sector 
management ‘predict-and-mitigate’ model operating within risk-aware 
‘anticipatory governance’ of services (WEF, 2012). This will enable national, 
regional and local governments to avoid unnecessarily high long-term costs 
and exacerbation of social issues and also to ensure that best practice and 
opportunities for innovation are recognised and exploited.
Bearing this background in mind, the research detailed in this report 
identifies current practice in Scottish local government case studies in their 
approaches to implementing austerity measures and considers the extent to 
which they recognise and seek to mitigate the resulting social risks.
approaches of other public sector bodies
It is not just councils who have to deal with austerity. Other public sector 
organisations such as the police and fire and rescue services, the NHS, and 
Scottish universities and colleges are engaging in similar processes to achieve 
cost savings through internal reorganisations of structures and service 
reconfiguration in the form of service transfer, service reduction, service 
withdrawal and joined-up services. Concerns have been raised in England that 
the NHS will have to make cuts to its frontline services in order to achieve 
efficiency savings in 2013 despite having its budgets protected by the UK 
Government (King’s Fund, 2011). This is because ageing demographics and 
other changes (e.g. rising obesity levels) are putting considerable pressure on 
largely static (albeit protected) NHS budgets (Kings Fund, 2011). Proposals 
to abolish Scotland’s eight existing police forces and to create a national 
force overseen by the Scottish Police Authority and responsible to Scottish 
ministers demonstrate a significant way of how joined-up service might 
achieve cost-savings (Scotsman, 2012). Similarly, as part of the Scottish 
Government’s rationalisation of further education, three colleges in Scotland 
have merged into one to share back-office services and overheads (e.g. 
buildings) and so be more efficient. Scottish universities already have 
a considerable role (albeit variable between institutions) in supporting 
disadvantaged communities by providing educational, cultural, social and 
recreational opportunities and facilities (Robinson, 2012). However, Scottish 
universities are also facing cuts to budgets comparable to those faced by 
councils, especially as Scottish students do not pay tuition fees.
Service reduction relates more to the streamlining of university degrees 
than to reduced student places. Cost savings can be achieved by reducing 
students’ choice among a variety of overlapping degree programmes 
(especially business degrees in marketing, management, economics and so 
on). Service reduction in the NHS includes decisions by health authorities 
to no longer provide some types of cosmetic surgery, notwithstanding the 
‘adverse implications for mental health’ justification of some operations.
Service withdrawal includes decisions by NICE (the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence) that some pharmaceuticals and medical 
treatments do not satisfy benefit-cost requirements and so should not be 
prescribed or provided. Recent examples include prescribing very expensive 
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treatments that prolong life for only very short periods of time, that money 
being judged to be better spent on other treatments.
Joined-up services have already been developed prior to the austerity 
era between health authorities and local governments, for example in social 
and nursing care establishments, in the multi-specialist teams determining 
need for care and personal budgets for older people and now in public 
health. Such developments can be expected to increase in the health and 
social care sectors. However, rather than the rationale for such joined-
up provision being savings in operational costs, the main justification is to 
improve substantially the outcome effectiveness of services. Nonetheless, 
such positive outcomes have considerable potential to reduce service needs 
(and hence costs) in the longer term. Joined-up services in the university 
sector would seem to be much more focused on cost savings (e.g. in library 
resources) than targeting improved outcomes.
Our research found no evidence of service transfer in the five local 
governments. Moreover, there seems to be little if any evidence of service 
transfer in the wider public sector except when instigated by central 
government, for example giving local government responsibility for 
promoting public health.
What lessons for Scottish local authorities can be drawn from the 
experiences in other parts of the public sector in managing austerity? First, 
like the Scottish universities and NHS, after making the immediate stage 1 
cost savings from ‘reduction, redeployment and reshaping’ seen as necessary 
to balance their budgets councils should pay much more attention to moving 
well into stage 2, the reconfiguration of services that is not so heavily focused 
on cuts in discretionary services. Cutting discretionary services may seem the 
easiest option (or, at least, the only one consistent with protecting statutory 
services) but that may be at the expense of greater service needs in the 
future, including needs for statutory services. Both discretionary and statutory 
services need to be reconfigured, instead of simply cutting the former 
immediately to protect the latter (at least for a while).
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2 aiMs and ObjEcTivEs 
Of REsEaRch
This aim of this research is to explore Scottish 
local authorities’ use of decision-making criteria, 
frameworks and priority-setting processes, if any, 
to determine whether they take sufficient account 
of the risks faced by the most disadvantaged groups 
in the reconfiguration of public services. The overall 
aim will be achieved by addressing the following 
specific objectives:
•	 Identify and measure the potential and actual impact of budget cuts on 
disadvantaged communities.
•	 Draw instructive comparisons with the approaches of other public and 
para-public sector bodies (such as NHS Scotland and Scottish universities) 
to service redesign and reduction.
•	 Identify criteria, frameworks and priority-setting processes that are, or 
could be, used when deciding cuts and reconfiguration.
•	 Determine whether risk implications for disadvantaged groups are 
sufficiently recognised by policy-makers in order for risk-mitigation 
measures to be adopted.
•	 Assess if and how the totality of public services needs of high-risk groups 
are addressed and whether community stakeholders are sufficiently 
involved and empowered, identifying good practice in reconfiguring the 
totality of public services for those groups.
•	 Identify existing and innovative financing methods for capital projects and 
service delivery for disadvantaged groups that can be used to mitigate 
social risk.
•	 Identify best practice for management and minimisation of current and 
future risks faced by disadvantaged groups in conditions of continuing 
resource scarcity and draw relevant recommendations for decision-
making policy and practice.
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3 REsEaRch METhOds
Research methodology
Five Scottish local authorities took part in this case-study based research. 
Their anonymity being assured, suffice to say that they are local authorities 
with disadvantaged groups already recognised for regional and urban policy 
purposes. Of the five case studies, four have been selected from the central 
belt of Scotland and one is located in a rural island area. Their political 
control, urban–rural balance, and mix of deprivation and affluence vary. 
There are several features of rural Scotland which suggest that the impact 
of the cuts on disadvantaged and vulnerable groups may be greater than 
in urban Scotland, including the higher prices for household commodities 
including fuel and food; the high cost of private housing relative to earnings 
in rural areas and the very limited supply of affordable housing; the higher 
costs of service provision; and the smaller size of the private sector (and its 
limited ability to ‘soak-up’ jobs lost in the public sector) (SAC, 2011). This 
differential context is considered in this research.
This research adopts a triangulation approach utilising an inductive, 
exploratory method based on documentary analysis (case study stages 1 and 
2) and semi-structured in-depth interviews with local authority managers 
(case study stage 3). Case study interviews and other fieldwork were 
conducted between August 2011 and November 2012.
Case study stage 1: Secondary data was collated from the local authorities’ 
websites in the form of a variety of eGovernment publications; for example, 
Equality Impact Assessments (EIAs), press releases, policy documents 
and minutes of committee meetings (education, social care, corporate, 
audit and finance) which provided a contextual understanding of the 
policy environment within which local authorities consider vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups. The intent of the initial documentary analysis was 
to explore the decision-making criteria referred to, if at all, in resource 
allocation and any initial proposals for the reconfiguration of services.
Case study stage 2: Further analysis was conducted of key documents 
obtained from the local authority during interviews; for example, Joint 
Community Care Plans 2009–2011, Joint Health Improvement Plans, 
examples of EIAs and (where available) reports monitoring the impact of 
the 2009 recession. These documents helped us understand better the 
processes being utilised. Both stages 1 and 2 informed the development of 
interview questions for stage 3.
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Case study stage 3: Table 1 outlines interviewees and for the purpose 
of anonymity the specific titles of interviewees are not listed instead, 
interviewees have been grouped by service areas.
The use of triangulation of research methods ensured the validity and 
reliability of the findings as empirical research is supported by multiple 
sources of evidence. This also facilitates a systematic and comprehensive 
analysis of key issues
challenges and limitations of research
From initial contacts with case study local authorities, it became clear that 
the issues relating to service cuts can be a contentious area of discussion. 
For this reason case study authorities and individual respondents remain 
anonymous.
The key issues identified from pilot interviews were related to:
•	 the stage at which local authorities are at in terms of their decision-
making processes;
•	 the terminology used, in particular with reference to the welfare reform; 
and
•	 the precise wording of some questions.
All case study local authorities appeared to be at relatively early stages of 
modifying their decision-making processes for service reconfiguration. We 
unified with our respondents the terminology used in relation to the welfare 
reform. Given the nomenclature of categories describing vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, a decision was taken by the research team to allow the 
local authority to categorise what they considered to be their vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups.
Table 1 – list of interviewees
levels of service numbers interviewed across the 
five case study local authorities
Heads of social work 4
Heads of education 5
Heads of finance 4
Equality, poverty, policy and performance managers 7
Elected members 6
Youth or older people services managers 4
Heads of housing regeneration 3
TOTAL = 33
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4 REsEaRch findings 
and discussiOn
assessing and addressing the impact of the spending cuts
At this stage it is not possible to assess precisely the actual impact of the 
budget cuts on disadvantaged communities in Scotland. Given the early 
stages of service reconfiguration evidence is mainly anecdotal and the 
impact will not become entirely clear for a number of years as cuts take hold. 
Nevertheless, we have found evidence that local authorities may exacerbate 
current inequalities across disadvantaged communities in their actions to 
reconfigure public services as a result of reduced budgets for service provision. 
Our analysis focuses on establishing existing awareness of the cuts, on 
planning the initial decision-making frameworks and on mitigation measures.
Categorisation and prioritisation of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups
All interviewees found it difficult to categorise vulnerable groups as at one 
stage or another all individuals will experience some form of disadvantage. It 
was suggested that there is:
“….no doubt that any cuts will impact upon vulnerable groups but 
what we have been trying to do over the past few years is lessen the 
impact.”
(Director of Social Work, local authority C)
This demonstrates the complexity and significance of the predicament that 
case study local authorities are faced with. Yet, older people, children, young 
people, disabled people, minority ethnic groups and women were identified 
as being particularly vulnerable to budget cuts and job losses:
“Yes, it is complex to prioritise; if you were to say which groups are to 
be more affected by the economic climate then young people who are 
aspiring to go into work, including vulnerable school leavers, are at risk. 
In addition, younger children in vulnerable families, who may already 
face a range of pressures, will experience further difficulties at a time 
of economic hardship. Whatever the challenges it might be they 
become a top priority so depending on the information available to the 
council, there will be moments when these groups will be affected. It 
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requires a continuous review and evaluation to identify how they will 
be affected.”
(Director of Education, local authority A)
For example, in local authority B those expected to experience the most 
adverse impact from cuts to services are young people and families, 
single parents and homeless people. Traditionally older people and those 
with disabilities tend to be most protected by the local authority through 
legislation and it was suggested that those of working age could be expected 
to be the most vulnerable. Homelessness was identified as a key concern 
for housing and regeneration service departments. The Performance and 
Planning Manager in local authority A also noted that:
“With employment opportunities we are trying to encourage 
those with disabilities to develop skills and potential employment 
opportunities, but there are less opportunities due to the austerity 
measures in general and the economic climate.”
Evidently, the longer-term impact of the cuts may be a less skilful workforce 
with a consequent lack of opportunity. Similarly, the Fieldwork Manager in 
local authority A noted that there were issues surrounding older people’s 
care and increasing incidents of dementia, illustrating the impact this has on 
families as informal carers:
“In terms of our future risks and older people, older people are living 
longer but also there has been an increase in dementia across older 
people too. The majority of people going into care are 85+ so this 
indicates that we are sustaining people in the community longer. I 
have to say we may be sustaining them but so are families; families are 
coming to us under lots of pressure and looking for assistance.”
(Fieldwork Manager, local authority A)
Specifically, according to the Policy and Equality Officer C, cutting public 
spending has had a particularly negative impact on gender equality. Officers 
have identified that their budget proposals will have a disproportionate 
impact on women in terms of job losses, especially clerical, catering, cleaning, 
and childcare job categories and that reduced childcare provision will 
adversely affect both children and women. Service reconfiguration is also 
anticipated to have an adverse impact on racial equality issues due to the 
complete or partial withdrawal of services aimed at minority ethnic groups. 
Cuts to services will not only affect those identified as most at risk but also those 
on the margins of poverty. Nonetheless, we found that there is no direct link 
between the identification and prioritisation of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups and policy formulation in the case study local authorities.
Lack of data
In seeking to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged groups from spending cuts, 
there are difficult challenges in measuring the actual and potential impact of 
accumulative spending cuts on disadvantaged communities. The following data 
issues were identified:
•	 There is a lack of data on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Data that 
does exist can be limited in application and too out of date to be able to 
measure accurately the impact of the cuts.
22Managing the social risks of public spending cuts in Scotland
•	 Simplistic data collection systems fail to capture the precise data required 
to enable accurate analysis of current and future projected trends.
•	 There are inconsistencies in data collection and recording of data across 
departments (i.e. the health and social care department may record 
information differently to and in ways incompatible with the housing 
department).
•	 There are challenges in measuring the outcomes of preventive initiatives 
as an evidence base to justify further investment during decision-making 
and mitigating risks to the most vulnerable groups. This is because the 
counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened without those measures) is 
largely unquantifiable.
It was suggested that this can often present a difficulty in creating a case 
to a Council Executive for further investment in early intervention and 
preventive measures during the decision-making process. One interviewee 
(Youth Service Team Manager, local authority C) commented, “How can you 
measure what has been prevented?” and there lies the difficulty in measuring 
potential outcomes. Furthermore, much of the existing data is backward 
looking, some as far back as the census population in 2001. This data was 
subsequently updated only in part by the Department of Work and Pensions, 
councils and other organisations and is still not fit for purpose in terms of 
social risk mitigation. This can make the decision-making process used as 
part of the EIA too limited.
While the Scotland’s 2011 Census will provide a rich source of data for 
case study local authorities on vulnerable and disadvantaged communities 
thereby enabling some analysis of any socioeconomic distinctions across 
protected characteristics, results will not be available until late 2012 or 2013. 
By this time many decisions based on outdated information will have already 
been taken by local authorities. Moreover, despite the availability of national 
and regional statistics, the data is often described as too aggregated and not 
sufficiently detailed at a local level. As noted above, data also tends to be 
unreliable and/or incompatible between different sources and departments. 
Often policy teams are reliant on partial information to make policy decisions 
and conduct EIAs, this deficiency having been cited by all five local authorities 
as an obstacle to informed decision-making:
“We have found that within housing they have two or three different 
returns which need data, so they have different systems even within 
one resource and it is very difficult to overcome that. We [social work] 
weren’t able to tell how many wheelchair users we have and vice versa 
[housing]. The data is not collated well. We have wheelchair users 
which may not need adaptations but we have no way of linking that 
data. That goes back to requirements of data collection.”
(Performance Manager Social Work, local authority A)
While other data sources may exist with up-to-date information, for example 
as part of the provision of Housing Benefit, with the Jobcentre Plus or with 
Citizens Advice Bureaus, case study local authorities did not specifically refer 
to the use of such to inform decision-making. To measure the actual impact 
of the UK spending cuts on vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, local 
authorities need to develop more sophisticated systems to capture and evaluate 
data and be capable of systematic analysis to inform future decision-making. 
More robust and relevant data needs to be gathered relating to longer-term 
social risks arising from austerity. Attention should be paid to improving the 
quality of existing data and improving access to and use of it to monitor 
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developments in social risk and its mitigation. While local authorities referred 
to the need to monitor the impact of the cuts there were no specific 
examples of how this was being carried out.
Service reconfiguration
All five local authorities engaged in efficiency savings programmes through 
internal reorganisation to protect frontline services in the first instance. In service 
reconfiguration there is evidence of service transfer, service reduction, service 
withdrawal and increased service charges, all of which have the potential to 
impact adversely on disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Figure 1 illustrates 
service reconfiguration.
Efficiency savings
The first stage of efficiency savings by each of the five case study authorities 
was an internal reorganisation of departmental structures which has resulted 
in a rationalisation of staffing and working environments. Changes include a 
reduction in heads of service, managerial staff and further staffing reductions 
in relation to reshaping frontline services. This was achieved via flexible 
working conditions including redeployment, hot-desking, smart-working, 
rationalisation of assets and moving from leased accommodation into 
council-owned accommodation. Additionally, local authority B engaged in 
organisational efficiency savings through the development of shared back 
office functions. Notwithstanding attempts to protect frontline services, 
reduced staffing has had a negative impact on delivery of both statutory 
and discretionary services, and governance arrangements were identified as 
a key problem due to service departments working in isolation from other 
service departments, this so-called ‘silo mentality’ pervading across the 
organisations. Furthermore, public service cuts contribute to unemployment 
in Scotland.
As part of the internal reorganisation staffing has been reduced 
disproportionately in some local authority departments and functions. For 
example, in local authority C the youth services department has experienced 
the biggest proportionate cuts and in local authority D approximately 25 per 
cent of all job losses will be from the social work department. Furthermore, 
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figure 1: stages of service reconfiguration
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support co-ordinators, peripatetic nursery teachers, and removed 16+ 
development posts. This contradicts the priorities and policies of the Scottish 
Government to reduce inequality in health and wellbeing among children and 
young people and does little to protect these vulnerable communities (Public 
Services Commission, 2011). One interviewee (Youth Services Team Leader, 
authority C) summarised the confusion and frustration that staff reductions 
have caused:
“There was a period of uncertainty when each week someone was 
given early retirement or a voluntary redundancy package. Although 
there were no compulsory redundancies [in the Council], you [staff] 
were finding that people were disappearing and [staff were] thinking 
‘Well, who is responsible for that?’ [and the response was] ‘We [the 
council/department] aren’t doing that anymore,’ or ‘So-and-so is 
responsible,’ or ‘There is no one in that post anymore.’ So we [staff] 
are constantly going through that!”
(Youth Services Worker, local authority C)
Following an internal reorganisation the second stage is the reconfiguration 
of service provision including service transfer, service reduction, service 
withdrawal and increased service charges (see Figure 1). Focusing on the 
education, social work, housing and regeneration departments, we found that 
so far the five authorities have not completely withdrawn any core services, 
opting for joined-up working and service reconfiguration. The councils 
appear to have resorted to protecting their statutory requirements as funding 
for discretionary services has shrunk and tough decisions have to be made. In 
embarking on service reconfiguration all five local authorities considered 
which services are statutory and those which are discretionary (i.e. having 
no legal requirement to provide). These authorities are increasingly moving 
towards protecting statutory services based on considerations such as 
‘What do the council does NOT need to do’ (Director of Social Work, local 
authority C).
Service withdrawal
None of the five case study councils has completely withdrawn any core public 
services. This is because, as noted above, decisions to withdraw services have 
the potential to negatively affect longer-term health and wellbeing and 
educational priorities. There have been school closures in local authorities C 
and E but this was as part of school rationalisation programme due to falling 
school rolls. Examples of discretionary service withdrawals include: knitting 
instructors, grass cutting services, swimming lessons for school children, 
mobile libraries, foreign language assistants, community wardens, English as 
an additional language teams, free bottled water for primary school children 
and some learning locality budgets introduced to promote social, economic 
and environmental wellbeing.
Service reduction
Service delivery has been reduced (rather than withdrawn completely) for some 
statutory services, the choice between reduction and withdrawal varying from 
one council to another. For example, as noted above, one council withdrew 
completely all provision for foreign language assistants whereas the other 
local council only reduced the number of foreign language assistants and 
therefore still provide that service unlike the other council. At the other 
end of the age spectrum, in social care there has been a rationalisation of 
homecare; needs are assessed around basic requirements such as provision 
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of a bed, medication and help getting washed and dressed. Prior to the 
austerity measures the focus was on the quality and experience of homecare. 
However, reduced staffing has led to reduced contact time with individuals in 
their home.
Much the same can be said for discretionary services. There has been 
a reduction in grass-cutting in one local authority, which has limited the 
service provided for older people living in houses with gardens. Reduced 
budgets for parental involvement projects, community safety, support for 
violence against women, multi-agency partnerships and CCTV schemes 
will undoubtedly have a disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable 
communities. Community safety officers have been reduced in local authority 
C as has mediation services for anti-social behaviour. It is expected that local 
authority C will outsource as required for these services.
Service transfer
Two examples of service transfer were provided whereby delivery of a 
community care lunchtime club and housing support service have been 
transferred to the voluntary sector. Another authority considered (but had 
not yet implemented) transfer of community facilitates to volunteers. In each 
case local authorities found it more cost-effective to transfer the delivery 
of services rather than to deliver services in-house. In the cases of housing 
support services the voluntary sector was already involved in similar services. 
At this stage respondents reported a very limited use of service transfer. 
One reason for this is that local authorities are going through a process of 
rationalisation of their voluntary and charity sectors, scrutinising the services 
that they deliver to identify any duplications.
There was no evidence from this research of service transfer to the 
private sector to achieve cost-savings in service delivery. Given the current 
economic climate local authorities were reluctant to use this option in service 
reconfiguration at this stage due to the political controversy surrounding the 
outsourcing of services to the private sector. There was a general feeling that 
members of the public are often opposed to the use of the private sector 
in public service delivery. Existing tendering of services to deliver social 
care services did raise some key concerns. The current economic climate 
increases the risk that private sector providers of elderly care homes go into 
administration, leaving local authorities as the risk bearer of last resort. One 
local authority had already experienced challenges in this area, and it was 
evident that this was a key risk. Given the statutory requirements to deliver 
social care services local authorities would need to find alternative ways to 
provide these services.
Joined-up working
Case study local authorities are engaging in joined-up working in two 
ways. First, different council departments are working better together 
to deliver services, and, second, local authorities are joining with other 
public services organisations to protect frontline services from cuts. Local 
authority departments work together and they consider the totality of 
public service needs and the cumulative impact of cuts across departments. 
Local authority C had begun discussions for more joined-up service delivery 
with neighbouring local authorities in a bid to improve service efficiencies. 
Local authority A has merged two Women’s Aid organisations into one 
and promotes joined-up working across the health, social care and youth 
services.
Projections of an increasingly ageing population in all five local authorities 
is expected to increase demands on health and social care services and 
26Managing the social risks of public spending cuts in Scotland
require joined-up working across organisations. Recurring clinical episodes 
and repeat hospital admissions require a supportive response by a local 
authority to prevent admissions and so reduce future demand on services. 
Some local authorities are engaging in a joined-up approach with health teams 
to mitigate this risk.
There is also evidence of joined-up working between health and social 
care in particular:
“Most individuals involved in the health and social care sectors 
welcome the move towards joined-up services as a number of areas 
of service delivery cross over. Given that the health authority works 
across the both areas, although there may not be a direct link to 
a hospital or service, a knock-on effect has the tendency to exist 
within the network of services (i.e. if there is no bed in one hospital 
then that person may be moved to another, taking the place of other 
individuals). Key is transparency and honesty in delivering joined-up 
services. In the local authority area there have been proposals to close 
wards in hospitals and this is a politically sensitive issue.”
(Director of Social Work, local authority D)
Further suggestions around joined-up working extend to other public sector 
organisations:
“Maybe one more point to note is about how we work in Scotland’s 
councils through the Scotland’s children agenda and the community 
planning agenda. There is a need for us to be interacting with our 
major public sector partners – so health, police, social work on the 
area of [what] may be social priorities and, without doubt, that helps 
mitigate the dangers for specific services.”
(Finance Director, local authority A)
Case study local authorities intend to make better use of existing 
partnerships, including Community Planning Partnerships, which incorporate 
a number of organisations such as community groups, the NHS, and the 
police and fire and rescue services into a working group across all service 
areas. It has long been recognised that such joined-up service initiatives are 
justified more in terms of providing a holistic approach to service needs than 
in terms of achieving cost savings. In these terms, the austerity measures 
have provided the stimulus for changes that should have been made much 
sooner in order to coordinate administratively disparate public services so as 
to bring about potential improvements in outcomes.
Increased service charges
Further ‘savings’ have been achieved through initiatives to generate 
increased income from council tax collection (i.e. chasing arrears), planning 
fees (i.e. levying the full range and levels of fees set nationally), contractual 
arrangements (for sharing revenues and costs), increased rental income 
(not only increasing levels of rents but also reducing voids), reduced utilities 
costs (i.e. via energy-saving measures), maintenance costs (i.e. more efficient 
programming) and sales of assets in the form of buildings and machinery. 
Efficiency savings also include increased scrutiny of the services delivered 
by voluntary organisations and (as noted above) a transfer of services to the 
voluntary sector in one of the local authorities. The purpose is to lessen the 
impact on frontline services, but all interviewees acknowledged that councils 
have to do more with less:
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“Fees for sporting facilities are set to increase and reflect a more 
competitive rate like the private sector. However, they will be means 
tested to protect the most vulnerable. The council is under-pricing 
themselves in the delivery of service provision. For example, our [the 
council’s] swimming programme was very cheap in comparison to 
other local authorities and there was a huge waiting list so we re-
programmed the pools, got another swim coach and increased the 
charging to commercial rates rather than by inflation as usual.”
(Area Manager, local authority D)
In particular, local authority D has created a dedicated post with the remit of 
generating income and finding new ways of working to increase revenues. 
Other ways to increase revenue include charging other services for their 
use of council staff, for example teaching and sports tutors (referred to 
as ‘internal recharges’). As qualified staff they will be provided to other 
agencies at a price which reflects commercial activity representing a more 
entrepreneurial and innovative approach to raising revenue.
In protecting services such as leisure, increased charging to older and 
disabled people will affect vulnerable groups. Other examples of increased 
charging include ‘blue badge’ parking schemes, school buses for children, 
music tuition in schools, daycare services for adults with learning difficulties 
and increased charging for school meals above inflation. Although services 
remain mean tested, low-income households not eligible for financial 
support may struggle to afford services. This will have a negative impact on 
those on the margins of poverty who will also be affected by the forthcoming 
welfare reforms.
identification of criteria, frameworks and priority-setting 
processes
The EIA framework
In the identification of criteria, frameworks and priority-setting processes, 
the Equality Impact Assessment (EIA, or EQIA as it is sometimes referred to) 
is the main framework used by the case study local authorities. Developed 
prior to the austerity measures, the purpose of the EIA is to demonstrate 
that in decisions taken during service reconfiguration ‘due regard’ has been 
paid to equalities issues and specifically to those groups covered by protected 
characteristics detailed in the Equality Act 2010.1
Carrying out an EIA involves systematically assessing how a policy 
change (in terms of activities, functions, strategies, programmes, services 
or processes) may impact, either positively or negatively, on equalities 
groups. EIAs were conducted for nearly all proposals for both statutory and 
discretionary services, the exceptions being in the leisure and arts services 
in local authorities B and D. It was evident in those two local authorities that 
EIAs were relatively new and not all proposals had had an EIA conducted as 
they were not deemed significant at that stage.
Do EIAs protect disadvantaged and vulnerable groups?
By completing the EIA process, local authorities are able to demonstrate that 
they have given due regard to, and have considered the impact on equality for, 
those who fall within the protected characteristics criteria. The key focus is on 
compliance and protecting the local authority against any adverse impact 
from decisions made, and EIAs provide evidence that due consideration has 
been given to the equality implications of budgetary decisions. Nevertheless, 
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the EIA faces key limitations in terms of meeting the needs of the most 
vulnerable.
First, although required to consider the impact of proposals that may 
affect one group more than another, an EIA does not actually prevent local 
authorities making decisions contrary to promotion of greater equality. They are 
accountable for any such decisions through local democratic processes and, 
provided that decisions observe the law in respect of human rights, they have 
the freedom to seek to implement the political manifestos on which they 
were voted into power.
Second, even if councils fully observe EIA requirements and seek to 
protect equalities groups, other groups fail to be considered. This is because 
the criteria embedded in the EIA are limited to specific equalities groups, 
thereby failing to consider the wider implications of the austerity measures 
and the social risks they create for other groups at risk of increased 
inequality, for example low-income households that do not display equalities 
criteria.
Third, by completing the EIA process, local authorities demonstrate that they 
have considered and identified the impact on equalities groups but they are not 
required to state whether (and, if so, how) they will mitigate any risks identified 
for a particular group. The key incentive for councils to undertake EIAs is 
compliance with the equalities legislation by ensuring that there is recorded 
evidence of that process having taken place: it is not for the purposes of risk 
mitigation.
Fourth, even if the EIA is used specifically for risk mitigation purposes, the 
fact is that it is singularly inappropriate as a risk mitigation tool. This is because 
it was not developed for this purpose and so is severely limited in its use 
to consider the wider impacts of austerity measures on all socioeconomic 
groups.
Despite these severe limitations being inherent to the EIA process, it 
seems that there has been increased take-up by the case study councils in 
its use as the prime risk mitigation tool used in responding to the austerity 
measures. Unfortunately, those inherent deficiencies are exacerbated by the 
use of inappropriate data.
Issues with data used to inform decision-making
To undertake the EIA process, elected members are provided with various 
sets of information for each proposal, including risk assessments and 
organisational/employee assessments. However, much of that data is 
inappropriate for the purposes for which it is being used. Much of the 
information currently available comes from qualitative research or focused 
studies rather than national data sets. The gaps in data and information 
relating to several equalities strands makes it difficult to source official 
statistics or data to assist in compiling evidence of need for particular 
services. The Policy and Performance Manager, local authority A, explained:
“Each service department has different systems and different ways of 
storing data; for example, social work will have different systems to 
housing. So trying to assess cumulative impact is very difficult. I think 
that’s what the austerity measures are throwing up: challenges that we 
didn’t know about –or ever needed to consider before the austerity 
measures – to the same extent. There will be a small core group that 
will receive services from all of us [different services].”
The Planning and Performance Manager went on to explain specifically the 
challenges of different data storage systems:
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“This is a huge barrier in decision-making which came out in a 
conversation with housing and our department [social work]. 
We found that within housing they have two or three different 
[information] returns which require data. They have different systems 
even within one resource and it is very difficult to overcome that. So 
makes it difficult to do the matching up in the totality of public services 
due to incompatible data collection. We [social work department] 
weren’t able to tell how many wheelchair users that we have and vice 
versa. The data is not collated well. We have wheelchair users which 
may not need adaptations but we have no way of linking that data. 
That goes back to the requirements of data collection at a national 
level.”
Thus, other sources of data or evidence are often used as proxies and 
so decision-making can be flawed and not truly reflect need. More 
widespread availability of official data would greatly help the councils to 
engage in evidence-based decision-making. Meanwhile, the lack of reliable, 
authoritative and comprehensive data and research is a considerable problem 
for those councils seeking to mitigate social risks arising from austerity 
measures.
Policy innovation in risk mitigation criteria
In the five case study authorities there is no evidence of development of 
completely new risk mitigation processes and criteria specifically in response 
to the austerity measures. However, there is evidence of augmentation of 
existing EIA processes and criteria to be more tailored to meet the needs of 
service users in local authorities A, D and E.
“We [local authority A] are evolving the EIA process and extending it 
beyond the remit which is required by the council. The department 
uses the EIA generic document supplied by the council as a starting 
point. The Health Scotland EIA was preferred as it is much broader 
that just equality groups, it gets you to think more laterally. It goes 
beyond just equalities groups and looks at lifestyles, health and 
wellbeing, social impacts, physical environment and quality of services. 
It is a holistic approach and goes beyond the idea that social work ‘just’ 
provides types of services for individuals but considers the impact on 
groups of people as users of different services not just one individual 
using one service. Furthermore, the Health Scotland EIA allows human 
rights issues to be explored as part of the assessment.”
(Performance and Practice Manager Social Work, local authority A)
To complement the EIA process, local authority E is in the process of 
developing a Poverty Impact Assessment (PIA) and any change in the budget 
is subjected to such a PIA. The rationale for the development of the PIA was 
the failing of the EIA to address social issues not captured by the EIA, for 
example issues with increased unemployment leading to higher levels of 
poverty. It was suggested by a senior practitioner in local authority E that 
equalities groups tend to experience poverty but the message has been lost 
between equality, poverty and disadvantage. It is intended that the PIA will 
bridge this gap. The focus of the PIA is poverty-proofing service proposals to 
protect those most at risk from service reform and interviewees found it very 
effective in starting the dialogue around these issues.
Nonetheless, there was no evidence of the development of ‘bespoke’ 
decision-making models or risk mitigation criteria to specifically address austerity 
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measures. The five local authorities have not adopted any further decision-
making criteria; for example, equality budget analysis, participatory budgeting 
and poverty sensitive budget analysis for the purpose of the austerity 
measures. Only local authorities A and B had engaged in participatory 
budgeting but not specifically for use as a risk mitigation model. Decision-
making with regards to equalities issues is restricted to the EIA and relevant 
service legislation with evidence of augmentation.
Role of the single outcome agreement in priority setting
Developed prior to the austerity measures taking hold, it was suggested that 
the Single Outcome Agreement (SOA), does not reflect the changing priorities 
resulting from the austerity measures nor does it explicitly refer to risk. By 
default, it adopts a ‘risk neutral’ stance.
The SOA is a binding agreement between local and national government 
that defines the overarching priorities and principles in the budget-
setting process for each case study local authority. Decision-making at a 
departmental level reflects such priorities. However, it was suggested that 
the SOA, settled in 2007, is out-of-step with the current economic climate 
and is failing to reflect changing priorities. The Head of Social Work in 
local authority D criticised the SOA as it has not provided councils with the 
flexibility intended when removing ring-fenced funding to give them the 
freedom to spend those funds in accordance with their own priorities:
“In a sense, when we started out with the SOA it was a big step 
forward for local government. I would expect that after the May 2012 
election there will be discussion surrounding the SOA and whether it 
should return to the agenda. I think at the beginning the SOAs were 
great but in the last few years it [the SOAs] has not really worked 
out as was hoped in our council [D]. They were important at a point 
in time, they could be important again, but to do so it would require 
a genuine application of the SOA policy to everything that you are 
doing over a number of years. Also they were designed before the 
crash – so are they reflective of the current economic situation as 
guiding principles? I don’t think so.”
(Executive Director of Social Work, local authority D)
As an overarching framework to guide prioritisation in the decision-making 
process the SOA may therefore be ineffective in the current climate.
Political agenda
It was suggested that each of the local authorities’ guiding principles, to an 
extent, reflect a political agenda in meeting the needs of the electorate in 
terms of political and reputational risk. The key priority is to protect frontline 
services but ‘popular votes’ and ‘likeability’ factors may take precedence. One 
council (C) retracted a proposal for increased charging for daycare services 
due to unpopularity among the electorate and gave it further consideration. 
Other examples from case study local authorities include ‘emotive’ proposals 
such as charging pupils for using school buses, which became quite political 
and so the decision was reversed. Reversing decisions due to political risk is 
costly as funds will need to be redirected from elsewhere. It was evident that 
a strong political imperative exists in the decision-making processes, and 
decisions can be rescinded as a result of increasing unpopularity among the 
electorate.
In mitigating political and reputational risk, decisions may be taken which 
are not necessarily reflective of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
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socioeconomic groups within a local authority’s electorate. There was evidence 
of competing priorities influenced by political agenda in case study local 
authorities dependent on demographics. According to an elected member:
“So when you are making budget decisions you [the Council] can’t 
always put everything into the poorer areas because the majority of 
people are not in those areas so you have to make sure that there is 
a balanced approach to resource allocation. It is important to make 
sure that everyone gets some form of service; it’s a balancing act 
over time.”
(Elected Council Member, local authority C)
In local authorities A and D where a high percentage of the electorate live in 
areas with high levels of deprivation and multiculturalism, council priorities 
tend to reflect the most vulnerable in terms of political agenda. However, less 
deprivation exists in local authorities B and C and therefore council priorities 
do not reflect the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.
Speed, scale and aggregation of the cuts
Even where the political agenda may be more sympathetic to the need to 
mitigate social risks faced by vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, the 
speed, scale and aggregation of the spending cuts is causing considerable 
difficulties because decisions are having to be taken in such haste that sufficient 
consideration of social risks is often not possible. This was illustrated by three 
service managers:
“The difficulty is making decisions and making them quickly, because 
of the pressure and speed of everything is not conducive to the 
decision-making process.”
(Youth Services Team Leader, local authority C)
“So while the long-term ambition may feel comfortable, the speed 
of change without resourcing that [ambition] and without putting in 
some sort of supported employment mechanism, then we are unsure 
how that will work.”
(Policy Officer, local authority B)
In some cases this creates additional pressures:
“The speed of the cuts is incredible. Well, what I do know, in terms of 
the implementation of efficiency savings and service reconfiguration 
– the training required and the cultural shift – it’s been a nightmare. 
I know people are punch-drunk with it and under significant pressure 
trying to take on the new learning and change the way we are doing 
things; organisationally it has been a mammoth task to do. I don’t think 
people have had the time to put their head above the water.”
(Field Practice Manager, local authority A)
On the other hand, local authorities have benefited from the delay of one 
year (noted above) in the implementation of the cuts in Scotland as opposed 
to England and therefore have had more time to prepare and learn from 
their counterparts:
“I think we have had time to think about it. Unlike those [local 
authorities] in England, we [local government] have had the protection 
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up here from the [Scottish] government. So we have had that time, 
whereas down South that’s where we can see the short-termism has 
just happened.”
(Finance Director, local authority A)
Although individuals discuss social risk mitigation as part of their daily job 
routine, it is implicit rather than explicit. We found that there is a lack of 
systematic codified recording of social risk issues and risk mitigation within 
the five local authorities as a whole and as part of their decision-making 
processes. Notwithstanding the aggregative effect of the cuts, given their 
speed and scale it is necessary to record social risks in an explicit and 
consistent manner to ensure that everyone is aware of the issues: policy 
makers, practitioners, voters and service users.
Recognition of risk implications by policy-makers
In preventive discretionary services council departments are seeing 
major changes as a result of the budget reductions and retraction that 
are necessary to protect statutory services and hence meet legislative 
requirements. The challenge for dealing with austerity measures is meeting 
short-term ‘reactive’ objectives (such as crisis and intensive support) 
alongside investment in longer-term future-proofing of services. In terms of 
considering short-term responses versus long-term impacts one interviewee 
commented that:
“If I am to be honest [in preventive spend] they [the council] appear to 
be considering its importance, but in reality they [the council] appear 
to be between a rock and a hard place.”
(Youth Services Team Leader, local authority C)
While some councils use the EIA as a means to protect equalities groups 
from the negative impacts of the reduced budgets and public service reform, 
the reduced budgets make it increasingly difficult to focus on preventive 
spend measures and to provide continued financial support for some key 
services that are aimed at the most vulnerable.
Other issues include a lack of investment in community regeneration 
and the need for crisis intervention related to child protection. The failure 
to focus on the longer-term consequences of under-investment in key 
areas of development will undoubtedly have an impact on vulnerable and 
disadvantaged communities living in areas requiring investment.
Apropos child protection, if a child needs to move to secure residential 
care the impact on the childcare budget is around £300,000 per placement 
per year. The social work department has no alternative but to finance this 
even though it may be at the expense of other services.
“The council needs to engage in reactive spend. There are children 
which require significant support throughout the year which cannot 
be predicted. We [the council] can all see the need and benefit of 
preventative spend but it just isn’t possible as a local authority to make 
that commitment in the current economic climate.”
(Director of Social Work, local authority A)
In principle, a Scottish Government policy direction exists to focus resources 
on preventive measures and should be a key objective of public service 
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reform (Public Services Commission, 2011). In reality case study local 
authorities are finding it difficult to focus on such measures:
“We do less of the supportive non-statutory stuff than the council 
used to do and focus more on what we have to do. The irony of 
that is if you are looking to develop early intervention or prevention 
strategies, a lot of that really has to be informed by voluntarism – 
people going along to breast-feeding, healthy eating classes – as they 
can’t be forced. Although those services currently still exist they are 
not available to the same extent as prior to budget reductions and 
volume.”
(Head of Social Work, local authority C)
The Head of Finance at local authority B noted that:
“We have missed an opportunity to sort things out in the past 15–
20 years in relation to the separation of discretionary and statutory 
services. They [the local authority] have never quite gotten the 
relationship – if we cut here (in one area) then that (in another area) 
goes out of control. So youth services is a classic example of this; as it 
is seen to be quick win financially, it is Norfolk which has just stopped 
all their youth services. What impact will that have on the police 
in six months time? I don’t think the long-term impacts of service 
reconfiguration have been considered sufficiently.”
There is a lack of consideration of the longer-term risk implications by 
policy-makers as budgets for discretionary services are expected to reduce 
further in prospective years. Given the limitations of the EIA process in 
assessing the risk implications of services changes to wider socioeconomic 
groups, this is of concern and particularly so when combined with a lack of 
consideration at a more strategic level.
consideration of the totality of service provision
All case study local authorities noted that consideration of the totality of public 
services has gained momentum as a result of the austerity measures. Local 
authorities are increasingly developing practices such as service managers 
working across their own departmental boundaries with other council 
departments and, ideally, with external bodies so that the various providers 
of related services join together and align their priorities. Local authority C 
for example has introduced governance arrangements which make it easier 
to consider the total effect of service reconfiguration on service users. In 
this case the housing, social work and education departments operate under 
one umbrella with a single Director of services overseeing each service. 
While some local authorities prioritise the totality of service provision, this 
tends to be limited due to a lack of capacity or sufficient awareness. It was 
suggested that there should be a shift in focus to outcomes for service 
users and the local authorities should ‘map’ the services likely to be required 
by a vulnerable individual or by disadvantaged groups. This should involve 
all service organisations as there is a risk to ‘distort one and it impacts on 
something else’. It is evident that while some steps have been made to 
consider the total impact of various reforms to services with strategic review 
teams being created, there is little evidence that this is an explicit part of 
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the decision-making process and therefore there is a risk that this is not 
considered for all proposals.
community empowerment
We found that all five local authorities practise some elements of stakeholder 
community engagement, as they have already carried out various consultations 
with residents, local communities, young people and employees to underpin the 
decision-making processes for 2012/13. The purpose of such consultations 
is to identify the priorities of residents for the protection of services. The 
budget reduction options included preventive spend, priorities in meeting the 
needs of vulnerable groups and joined-up working with other partners and 
local authorities. Consultations took the form of questionnaire surveys, focus 
groups, community meetings and citizens’ panels:
“Yes, we have lots of ways of engaging our stakeholders, from 
consultation with the parents’ groups to trade union representatives. 
It is very well developed [with regard to] negotiating and consulting 
arrangements. Parent councils have a sounding board, to which two or 
three key influencers come into. We have councils in every school that 
meet regularly; we formally consult with parents around the schools. 
At a corporate level there is consultation through the citizens’ panels 
on the specific issue of savings for the year coming; that process will 
come in the near term – November to December. I’m not sure how 
the discussions are structured but the objective is to get views from 
citizens’-panel members about efficiency savings.”
(Finance Director, local authority A)
According to the Heads of Social Work and Education in local authorities 
A, C, D and E their transparent approach to service reconfiguration in some 
cases reduced the anticipated negative response to council proposals by local 
communities. This has resulted in a far more understanding electorate 
regarding the tough decisions that had to be made. A key issue with 
community consultation, according to the Head of Social Work at local 
authority A, is the point in time when the council engages service users and 
the political implications:
“One of the key issues of impact assessment for us is that these 
savings [proposals] need to go through a political process. So the 
problem is if you consult the service users before the cuts have 
actually been through the process you might set hares running for 
something that might not ever actually happen. So it’s a real quandary 
for us as to when you actually start doing the impact assessment and 
when you start involving people.”
(Head of Social Work Resources, local authority A)
Another contentious point according to the Head of Social Work from local 
authority D is whether there can be too much community consultation and, 
in particular, whether it is truly beneficial, perhaps reflecting the uncertainty 
surrounding the consultation process. Thus, the real extent to which 
communities’ views are considered as part of the decision-making processes is 
unknown at this stage.
Local authority C noted that community consultation is considered 
systematically as part of their processes and provided significant evidence 
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of its community priorities to councillors. Yet, while there was evidence of 
the retraction of certain proposals due to their unpopularity among voters, 
this indicates that community groups have limited and rather reactive 
powers of veto, as distinct from being proactively and fully empowered and 
fully engaged in risk-mitigation decision-making processes. Ultimately, the 
benefits of consultation with voters and with groups of service users are 
limited by the predominant service-by-service approach to cuts within an 
organisationally fragmented portfolio of public services.
innovative financing mechanisms to mitigate spending 
cuts
Our research found some limited evidence of new innovative financing 
mechanisms for service delivery to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups which 
could be used to mitigate social risks. Local authority B provides a good 
example of community-based innovative financing mechanisms/initiatives 
for raising money for people with disabilities and for youth groups. Their 
initiatives include the production of goods to sell, such as locally produced 
soaps, and the repair and refurbishment of cars for resale. This is part of a 
strong community spirit which could be attributed to the rural island locality, 
distinctly different from the other four urban local authorities.
The community regeneration department in local authority C investigates 
ways of funding posts through their capital funding budgets. The local 
authority is also exploring ways to provide services via ‘spend-to-save’ 
initiatives financed via the Prudential Borrowing Framework. This approach 
was criticised by the Housing and Regeneration Manager, however, due to 
future uncertainties associated with the income stream thereby released to 
repay borrowed money.
summary of key research findings
The ongoing spending cuts in Scotland have already led to significant 
reductions in overall public spending, posing considerable challenges 
to resource allocation within diminished budgets of many public sector 
organisations, especially local authorities. It has been recognised by our case 
study local authorities that some disadvantaged groups are more severely 
affected than other social and demographic groups, in terms of experiencing 
a higher level of social risks such as poverty, social exclusion, marginalisation 
and lack of opportunity. This in turn can result in further undesirable 
social outcomes through a vicious cycle of self-reinforcing cumulative 
disadvantage. Evidence from case study local authorities suggests:
•	 At this stage it is not possible to assess the actual impact of the UK-wide 
spending cuts on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. The impact will 
not become entirely clear for a number of years as cuts take hold.
•	 In seeking to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged groups from spending 
cuts there are difficult challenges in measuring the actual and potential 
impact of cumulative spending cuts on disadvantaged communities.
•	 To measure the actual impact of the UK spending cuts on vulnerable 
and disadvantaged communities, local authorities need to develop more 
sophisticated systems to capture and evaluate data capable of systematic 
analysis to inform future decision-making.
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•	 Local authorities may exacerbate current inequalities across 
disadvantaged communities in their actions to reconfigure public services 
as a result of reduced budgets for service provision. Cutting public 
spending has had a particularly negative impact on gender equality in one 
case study local authority.
•	 Cuts to public services will not only affect those identified as most at 
risk but also those on the margins of poverty. Nonetheless, we found 
that there is no explicit and systematic identification and prioritisation of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups as local authorities found it difficult 
to prioritise.
•	 All five case study local authorities engaged in efficiency savings 
programmes through an internal reorganisation to protect frontline 
services in the first instance. In service reconfiguration there is evidence 
of service transfer, service reduction, service withdrawal and increased 
service charges, all of which have the potential to have an adverse impact 
on disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
•	 The councils appear to have resorted to protecting their statutory 
requirements as funding for discretionary services has shrunk and tough 
decisions have to be made. Service delivery has been reduced (rather than 
withdrawn completely) for some statutory services, the choice between 
reduction and withdrawal varying from one council to another (see page 24).
•	 In the five case study authorities there is no evidence of development 
of completely new risk mitigation processes and criteria specifically in 
response to the austerity measures. Local authority E is in the process 
of developing a Poverty Impact Assessment (PIA) and any change in 
the budget will be subjected to PIA. There was no evidence of the 
development of ‘bespoke’ decision-making models or risk mitigation 
criteria to specifically address austerity measures.
•	 As a framework for prioritisation, developed prior to the austerity 
measures taking hold, it was suggested that the Single Outcome 
Agreement does not reflect the changing priorities resulting from the 
austerity measures nor does it explicitly refer to risk. It is therefore not 
deemed suitable as a framework to prioritise service cuts.
•	 It was suggested that each local authority’s guiding principles, to an 
extent, reflect a political agenda in meeting the needs of the electorate, 
in terms of political and reputational risk. Even where the political agenda 
may be more sympathetic to the need to mitigate social risks faced by 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, the speed, scale and aggregation 
of the spending cuts is causing considerable difficulties because decisions 
have to be taken in such haste that giving sufficient consideration of 
social risks is often not possible.
•	 All case study local authorities noted that consideration of the totality of 
public services has gained momentum as a result of the austerity measures. 
It was suggested that there should be a shift in focus to outcomes for 
service users and the local authorities should ‘map’ the services likely to be 
required by vulnerable individuals or by disadvantaged groups.
•	 We found that all five local authorities practise some elements of 
stakeholder community engagement, as they have already carried out 
various consultations with residents, local communities, young people 
and employees to underpin the decision-making processes for 2012/13. 
Their transparent approach to service reconfiguration in some cases 
reduced the anticipated negative response from local communities. The 
real extent to which communities’ views are considered as part of the 




We conducted a workshop with 23 community 
stakeholders and representatives from Scottish local 
authorities, government departments, voluntary 
sector organisations, Improvement Services 
Scotland, COSLA (Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities), SOLACE (Society of Local Authority 
Chief Executives), senior managers from across 
the wider public sector and the Scotland Adviser to 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
innovative approaches to the spending cuts
Workshop participants confirmed the initial findings and provided other 
anecdotal evidence and general impressions of the emerging impact of 
austerity on local government services. They took the view that local 
authorities should consider utilising the resources available across the public 
sector as a whole through more innovative ways of working, for example 
improved partnerships. This means that they should not only consider their 
own budgets but also those of other agencies when seeking to manage 
austerity and to mitigate social risk. Considering only their own budgets 
limits the ability of a local authority to focus decision-making on service 
user needs, particularly for the most vulnerable, with the focus instead being 
on meeting financial constraints. In this economic climate local authorities 
find themselves in financial (rather than legislative) handcuffs and they may 
resort to ‘cost shunting’, in other words cutting their own spending but 
consequently (by design or default) shifting those costs on to other public 
sector bodies with no savings being achieved by the public sector as a whole. 
An example is where reductions in local authority spending on social care 
of older people leads to increased emergency admissions to hospital, overall 
costs to the public sector increasing as a result.
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Unfortunately, the ongoing structural reforms of health, social care and 
policing do not facilitate a holistic joined-up approach to the design and 
implementation of austerity measures, as those service reforms promote 
vertical (not horizontal) integration and thereby frustrate local control.
It was also suggested that the role of the third sector should be more 
prominent, there being scope to develop partnership delivery between local 
authorities and voluntary sector organisations, and for Community Planning 
Partnerships (CPPs) to improve joined-up thinking in service delivery. It 
was thought that such an approach does not require the development 
of new arrangements, but builds on existing structures instead. Yet, the 
Head of Housing and Regeneration at local authority C criticised the role 
of the CPPs, in terms of provision of financial resources and their overall 
effectiveness. He noted that while the partners sign up to the objectives of 
the CPP agreement they do not always fully engage in joined-up working 
and deliberation of resources. Such partnerships in local authority C appear 
unbalanced, and he suggested that a review of the current systems would be 
valuable to improve outcomes and effectiveness of joined-up working.
social risk impact and barriers to implementation
The term ‘social risk’ was welcomed by workshop participants as a ‘new 
language’ which could overcome the limitations of the cultural issues associated 
with the equalities and human rights agenda. The social impact of budgetary 
measures is lost when focusing on their implications for the equalities 
agenda. Additionally, the human rights agenda seems vague and difficult to 
understand, and so relating it to austerity measures is problematic. Hence, 
it was suggested that ‘social risk’ is a useful term to use as heads of service 
may understand it better than the terminology linked to the equalities and (in 
particular) human rights agendas.
Irrespective of the differences in these conceptual and practical toolkits, 
ideally they should all lead decision-making in the same direction: towards a 
compatible generic outcome. It was also stressed that whatever the decision-
making toolkit, there still needs to be a desire to mitigate the impact of austerity. 
The case study results suggest that local authorities do want to consider 
social risk more than they currently do but they do not have the time or 
capacity to innovate, and instead fall back on EIAs.
Despite acknowledging that equalities and human rights agendas should 
be at the core of decision-making in local government, it was suggested 
that there are often barriers to their implementation. These barriers include 
the complexity of the public service sector, the political agenda (which often 
means that equalities issues are ignored or viewed as a tick-box exercise) and 
a compliance-based (rather than a needs-based) approach. According to the 
view of one participant, rational and reasonable decision-making may not cover 
the political dimensions of taking tough decisions, suggesting that we should 
take into account the political dimensions.
Attendees identified another barrier as lack of guidance from the Scottish 
Government. Although guidance exists for the EIA process, it was criticised 
as being too generic and it was noted that more specific guidance is required 
which refers to the different nature of services delivered.
Likewise, the Single Outcome Agreement (SOA) is both too narrow and too 
broad to facilitate mitigation of social risk. It is too narrow in terms of not 
covering the whole of the Scottish public sector and yet too broad in having 
adopted (by default rather than by design) a risk-neutral stance. In order to 
formalise risk mitigation decision-making, it would have to include the other 
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two-thirds of the public sector, most notably the NHS, policing and child 
protection. It would also have to specifically recognise that the level and 
scope of decision-making is important and its cumulative ramifications over 
the years should be considered in the mitigation of social risk.
At the same time a consistent and joined-up approach is required across 
all 32 Scottish local authorities. They face a trade-off when considering the 
impact on service users of proposed cuts and service reconfigurations as 
distinct from that on the organisations themselves. Making services more 
resilient is not necessarily the same as protecting disadvantaged groups and 
making people more resilient in conditions of austerity.
Even if all these barriers could be overcome in principle, attendees 
noted that it is difficult in practice to incorporate policy lower down in the 
organisation. In particular, it was emphasised that a cultural change is required 
for local authorities to embrace new ways to deliver services as individuals 
and departments struggle to grasp the importance of adopting new ways of 
working. Those new ways require a new risk mitigation language, a much 
more detailed SOA and more robust strategic management, all three being 
important in the approach to risk mitigation.
Moving towards risk mitigation decision-making
There was resistance by some workshop participants to the development of 
“another assessment tool”. Rather than yet another assessment tool, they 
thought that guidance should be issued specifically for addressing the impact 
of social risks created through changing service delivery, especially for 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. This would require local authorities 
to utilise that guidance to inform their decision-making processes and to 
consider the ‘social risk impact’ of their austerity measures, embedding its 
consideration as part of daily operations.
However, attendees identified a gap between the data requirements of 
the different levels of government, exacerbated by the way in which available 
information is (or is not) shared. It was suggested that information provided 
to local authorities regarding the impact of austerity measures is inadequate 
and that they are uncertain about the indicators to be used to judge success 
or failure of those measures. This is exacerbated by the lack of up-to-date 
data for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups about the impact of the cuts. 
Furthermore, data in one part of the public sector often cannot ‘speak’ to 
another part; for example, the financial data in health authorities and local 
government. Put simply, the ways in which data is held in the different parts 
of the public sector are often incompatible with each other. Additionally, there 
needs to be a two-way flow of data between the two levels of government.
Hence, organisations and their services need to be joined up not only in terms 
of their delivery but also in terms of their data and its analysis. Joint planning 
will remain more problematic and less effective the slower the public sector as a 
whole is to develop compatible data series and to share that data, including its 
analysis.
In moving forward beyond the research findings, it was suggested that 
scenario planning around the impact of the cuts and of UK welfare reform would 
be advantageous for local authorities in that they would be better prepared. 
Furthermore, further discussion is required around the role of finance and 
the impact on service delivery of back office cuts. The foregoing analysis 
of deficiencies pertaining to the assessment and mitigation of social risks 
arising out of austerity has made clear that back office and short-term cuts 
will almost certainly affect frontline services in the not too distant future. 
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Claims that frontline services can be protected if only back office functions 
are cut are either too simplistic or disingenuous. Those claims either reflect 
a myopic and narrow approach to cost savings or provide a comforting but 
false reassurance that the levels and quality of services can be maintained 
notwithstanding the very substantial cuts in council budgets. Whether overly 
simplistic or disingenuous, neither scenario is indicative of a professional and 
socially acceptable approach to austerity measures.
Workshop participants identified the need for a ‘next’ risk mitigation 
practice, which follows on from EIAs. It is not that the research has identified 
cases of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ practice but, instead, it has identified the need for ‘next’ 
practice to inform future policy- and decision-making.
What ‘next’ practice must do is improve the role of social risk evaluation, 
and respondents at the workshop expressed the hope that further research 
can support local authorities to identify a ‘gold standard’ of risk mitigation 
practice for benchmarking purposes. This requires gathering and analysing high 
quality evidence of the potential and actual impacts of preventive measures. 
However, it was noted that it is very difficult to calculate the costs of 
outcomes; what we have at the moment is information on outcomes without 
the matching data on inputs (and processes and outputs) and, conversely, 
information on inputs without subsequent outcomes.
‘Next’ practice must include engaging the Scottish Government in social 
risk mitigation practice when determining budget allocations to individual 
local authorities. It was acknowledged that the Scottish Government now 
undertakes to publish an ‘Equality Statement’ to accompany its annual 
budget statement and spending review. However, it was suggested that 
this needed to be more specific to address the differential needs of local 
authorities.
Importantly, it was suggested that in order to get local government involved 
in the assessment of social risk, there should be a link between the identification 
of social risks and the potential consequent cost in monetary terms (but also 
non-monetary terms such as societal impact) to be faced by a council in, 
say, ten years due to increased demands on public services as a result of the 
austerity measures.
Such information is expected to incentivise local authorities to protect 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups so as to also protect their own budgets 
in the future. Without such information local authorities will inevitably retain 
a short-term approach in dealing with austerity because the financial and 
budgetary cuts are ‘here’ whereas the effects of those cuts are ‘there’ (i.e. in 
the future) and so preventive measures to mitigate the effects of those cuts 
on disadvantaged and vulnerable groups receive insufficient attention.
Attendees noted that models of risk assessment and prevention already 
exist in the Scottish public sector in respect of community safety, namely the 
fire service’s community safety advice and the community policing service. 
Delegates reported that the SOA and CPPs are already developing this 
form of risk assessment. Nevertheless, they also suggested that this approach 
needs to be made more systematic, holistic and formalised so as to help identify 
and plug any gaps in risk assessment and risk mitigation, writing down and 
codifying risks by going through a variant of the EIA process. Finally, it was 
noted that the Public Service Improvement Framework could possibly help to 
connect financial numbers with the impacts of austerity measures, but how it 
could do so was not considered.
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6 cOnclusiOn
a codified approach to management and mitigation of 
social risk
Although there is an emerging dialogue around social risk issues within the 
case study local authorities, at this stage there is no process or procedure 
which explicitly captures the consideration of increased social risks. This 
is of considerable concern due to the limitations of the equalities impact 
assessment (EIA) process in considering wider social risk implications.
Certain service areas such as social work and education seem to be more 
familiar with the social risk issues and the impact of the austerity measures 
on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, whereas other services such as 
housing and finance seem to be less aware. In this case it is important that 
the consideration of social risk is codified systematically and comprehensively 
so as to ensure that policy-makers and practitioners consider the social risk 
implications of austerity measures on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. 
To do this local authorities need to be more innovative and develop new 
criteria to meet the needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable service users.
To complement existing processes we propose a prototype decision-
making framework which would assess the potentially adverse social 
impacts of service reconfiguration in responding to austerity. Drawing on 
best practice from the local authority case studies, this ‘social risk impact 
assessment’ (sRia) model of decision-making will complement the existing 
EIA and other such assessments while encompassing those groups which fall 
outside the boundaries of specific and statutory equality and poverty criteria.
The results of this research identify the need for social risk mitigation to 
be embedded within the decision-making processes as much more progress 
needs to be made much faster in order to address this glaring deficiency. 
It behoves each local authority to develop a SRIA procedure by acting in 
concert with their local stakeholder groups, with the voluntary sector, with 
other public sector organisations and with national and regional governments 
to inform their decision-making and hence avoid unnecessarily high social 
risks (and consequently higher future costs to the public sector) arising from 
the scale, speed and aggregation of their austerity measures. The following 
chapter recommends how such SRIA process can be developed.
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7 REcOMMEndaTiOns
We recommend that service organisations may 
benefit from the consideration of a new category of 
‘social risk’ which is associated with the introduction 
of further disadvantage and/or marginalisation of 
groups and individuals. The term ‘social risk’ and 
‘social impact’ was identified in the workshop as a 
new language which could overcome the limitations 
of the cultural issues associated with the equalities 
and human rights agenda. Often the social impact 
of budgetary measures can be lost when attention 
is focused on their implications for the equalities 
agenda. Additionally, the human rights agenda has 
been described by some local authority respondents 
as being vague and difficult to understand, and so 
relating it to austerity measures can be problematic. 
Hence, during the workshop, it was suggested that 
‘social risk’ is a useful term to use as heads of service 
may understand it better than the terminology 
linked to the equalities and human rights agendas.
We identified the limitations of the EIA which make it unsuitable as a 
risk mitigation tool. Despite acknowledging that equalities and human 
rights agendas should be at the core of decision-making our respondents 
suggested that there are often barriers to their implementation, which 
include the complexity of the public service sector, the political agenda 
(which often means that equalities issues are ignored or viewed as a tick-box 
exercise) and a compliance-based (rather than a needs-based) approach. 
Rational and reasonable decision-making may not always cover the political 
dimensions of taking tough decisions, suggesting that the political dimension 
should be taken into account.
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Existing guidance for the EIA process was criticised by respondents as 
being too generic and it was noted that more specific guidance is required 
for different types of services. Thus any reform of impact assessment should 
take account of this suggestion. Overall, our research has identified the need 
to move beyond the EIA and look at the ‘next’ category of risk mitigation 
practice which follows on from EIAs and embraces wider issues related to 
further disadvantage and negative social outcomes. To complement existing 
processes we propose the development of a prototype decision-making 
framework which assesses the potentially adverse social impacts of service 
reconfiguration in local authorities. The following recommendations were 
derived from our research:
•	 If their austerity measures are to be well informed, local authorities 
must consider fully and explicitly the negative implications of the 
ongoing budget cuts to protect their local vulnerable and disadvantaged 
communities.
•	 Local authorities and other public service organisations could make their 
decisions more sustainable if they participate in a dialogue that explicitly 
captures the consideration of increased social risks for vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups as a result of the austerity measures. This dialogue 
requires a joined-up consistent approach across all 32 Scottish local 
authorities and other public sector organisations, including the fire and 
police services in their community safety roles.
•	 For that dialogue to be truly effective in managing and mitigating social 
risk, all public sector organisations need much more compatible, relevant, 
robust and comprehensive time-series data that can be analysed in order 
to identify potential and emergent social risks.
•	 The Scottish Government could help councils deal with austerity by 
facilitating development of the capacity for the collection and analysis of 
reliable and comprehensive data on the social risks faced by vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups. Such data could be used as evidence for 
decisions related to service cuts and reconfiguration.
•	 To achieve new ways of service delivery, local authorities will have 
to focus on a change in organisational culture in order to embrace 
innovative approaches to service delivery. That new organisational culture 
could fully engage and empower local communities in deciding on the 
implementation of austerity measures and the amelioration of potential 
social risks through co-design and co-production of services, and by 
utilising existing and as yet untapped skills and capacity in the voluntary 
and community sectors through new organisational forms, including 
mutual and co-operative models of service provision.
•	 Having identified ‘poor’ and ‘good’ social risk management practice a 
‘next’ stage of risk mitigation practice is required in order to inform 
future policy- and decision-making. To assess the potential and the actual 
impact of budget cuts local authorities need to evaluate the social risks 
arising from austerity measures, focusing on the interconnectivity of 
service needs and social risks, and recognising how the speed, scale and 
(in particular) aggregation of cuts compound the social risks faced by 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.
•	 Councils could better protect vulnerable and disadvantaged groups if 
they were to adopt a ‘total needs’ approach which focuses on intended 
outcomes for service users, not just the ‘total place’ initiative which is 
simply a cost-saving service-based approach to austerity. The ‘total needs’ 
approach would require the range and extent of social risks affecting local 
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vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to be comprehensively identified 
and evaluated as a part of the decision-making process.
•	 The ‘total needs’ approach makes clear that local authorities consider 
the limitations of the EIA as a means for social risk mitigation and that 
they should adopt bespoke risk mitigation decision-making models, 
frameworks and criteria which would ensure the protection of all 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, communities and individuals, not 
just those with EIA-protected characteristics.
•	 Social risk mitigation is a strategic consideration which could be 
embedded into all service reconfiguration decisions. This means that, 
while addressing the totality of service needs, local authorities should 
place emphasis on communication with vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups and their empowerment in decision-making.
Local authorities have scope to develop other revenue sources from which 
income can be raised to obviate the need for service cuts, including service 
charges. Nevertheless, it is important that price is not a barrier to accessing 
services and this possibility should be a key consideration in developing 
charging practices that take account both of need for service and ability to 
pay in order to better focus subsidy on disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
Such sophisticated and socially progressive use of charging can be 
implemented by seizing the austerity-engendered opportunity to both 
improve and de-politicise the charging process by engaging in a transparent 
approach to public engagement in local decision-making.
If the SOA is to guide councils’ strategic responses to austerity measures, 
it would be important to update it to reflect the changing priorities in local 
service delivery and the considerable social risks arising out of austerity. A 
revised SOA may recognise that the current range of free public services 
made universally available irrespective of need for service and ability to pay 
cannot be justified.
To ensure future proofing of services, local authorities can lead the 
way for developing long-term strategies for mitigation of social risk while 
balancing short-term and long-term measures. The UK and Scottish 
Governments could support this by recognising the social risks resulting from 
budget cuts and other austerity measures and provide relevant guidance to 
local authorities and other public service organisations.
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aPPEndix 1
council funding in scotland: devolution and austerity
The UK context
The proportion of local authority finance raised in the UK by taxes set by 
councils is, and has for a long time been, low by European standards and is 
reflected in a relatively high dependence on central grants. There has also 
long been a relatively low ratio of income derived from fees and charges 
and very restricted use of borrowing. Nevertheless, local government 
expenditure in the UK has long been relatively high as a share of both 
GDP and general government expenditure compared with other major EU 
countries such as France, Germany, Italy, but not Sweden. Local governments 
in other countries are not so heavily dependent on property tax, also taxing 
incomes, profits and expenditures (Bailey, 1999, 2004).
The relatively high proportions of total public spending accounted for by UK 
local governments, narrow local tax base, low proportions of revenues from 
charges and over-dependence on central government grants means that councils 
are very vulnerable to the public sector austerity measures being imposed by the 
UK Coalition Government.
The Scottish context
Typically, before the onset of austerity, over 90 per cent of local government 
total gross expenditure had been accounted for by revenue expenditure, of 
which just over a third spent on employee costs, just over two-fifths on 
other operating costs, and loan charges being the next largest expenditure 
item at just under a tenth of revenue expenditure. Capital expenditure has 
typically accounted for less than a tenth of total gross expenditure and has 
been mainly financed by sales of fixed assets and revenue contributions to 
capital outlay, these two sources being almost equal and together accounting 
for three-fifths of capital expenditure. Borrowing typically finances only 
two-fifths of capital expenditures. Given that loan charges have to be paid 
irrespective of the austerity measures and that capital expenditures are a 
small proportion of total spending, the structure of expenditures means that 
cuts must by necessity focus on employee and operating costs of services.
Central government grants (including Council Tax Benefit subsidy) 
accounted for 62 per cent of Scottish local authorities’ revenue income in 
2010–11, 12 per cent coming from fees and charges including rents, 11 per 
cent from non-domestic (i.e. business) property tax, 11 per cent from council 
tax (excluding Council Tax Benefit subsidy), the remaining 4 per cent being 
‘other income’ including that from interest on cash balances.
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The situation is much the same in the rest of the UK, the widely quoted 
85:15 (previously 80:20) ratio for grants to council tax being in respect of 
expenditure net of income from charges for services and treating business 
property tax revenues as central funding. Hence, although still heavily 
dependent on central funding, local authorities are not as heavily dependent on 
grants as generally perceived. The proportions of these categories of revenue 
and spending can be expected to change, some perhaps quite radically, as a 
result of the UK Coalition Government’s austerity measures.
Constraints on Scottish councils’ own-source revenues
On average, Scottish local authorities have typically financed only about 
a fifth of their general fund revenue expenditure from their own-source 
revenues, broadly 15 per cent from council tax and 5 per cent from fees and 
charges (exclusive of rents). Thus, to increase spending on their main services 
by one per cent, revenue from their own sources would have to rise by 5 
per cent, a gearing ratio of 5. If that rise in expenditure were to be financed 
wholly by council tax the gearing ratio rises to almost 7. Likewise, the gearing 
ratio for fees and charges is 20.
Hence, if councils were to seek to offset their losses of grants by increasing 
their rates of council tax and/or levels of charges both these own-source 
revenues would be subject to high gearing ratios. This makes it very difficult for 
councils to manage austerity other than by means of immediate reductions 
in their expenditures on employee and operating costs commensurate with 
the speed and scale of cuts in their grants.
The gearing ratio, and its corresponding financial constraint, is greatest 
for those authorities with relatively high expenditure need per head of 
population, relatively low taxable resources per capita and relatively high 
service costs (e.g. due to sparsity of population) because they receive 
proportionately higher levels of grants from the Scottish Government.
Hence, councils with relatively high proportions of disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups face the highest gearing ratios and so are much less able to 
mitigate the austerity-induced social risks faced by those groups than more 
affluent/low need local governments. The fact that incremental spending is 
constrained most where need for mitigation of social risk is greatest seems 
anomalous but is an inevitable outcome of high dependence on inter-
governmental grants.
In fact, the rate of council tax has been frozen since 2008–09 as part 
of the Concordat voluntarily agreed between the Scottish Government and 
the 32 councils. In theory, an individual council could choose to abandon the 
freeze (and, thereby, the Concordat?) but this course of action seems highly 
unlikely. This is because the Scottish Government has allocated larger grants 
to councils to (largely if not wholly) offset the loss of council tax revenues 
over the five years rates have been frozen. To ‘unfreeze’ council tax would 
therefore yield little additional revenue because grant would most probably 
be reduced by almost the same amount as the tax revenue gained.
More likely would be all councils taking united action (via COSLA) to 
unfreeze council tax as the Scottish Government’s ability to offset the freeze 
becomes increasingly limited by its own loss of funding as a result of the 
reductions in its block grant based on the Barnett formula which it receives 
from the UK Government (see Appendix 2). As long as council tax rates 
remain frozen local authority incremental budgeting will largely follow the 
Scottish Government’s expenditure plans and so will effectively be indirectly 
subject to the Barnett formula’s transmission of austerity.
However, unfreezing council tax to allow councils to break free of 
the Scottish Government’s Barnett formula ‘fiscal handcuffs’ would be 
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problematic because its high gearing would exacerbate the problems 
associated with that tax. These include council tax bills based on house 
values and so not directly related to ability to pay, that vertical inequity being 
exacerbated by the range of council tax bills being very much less than 
the range of incomes of council tax payers (there being only eight house 
valuation bands), about a third of families and two-fifths of pensioners not 
claiming the Council Tax Benefit to which they are eligible, and bills having 
previously risen much faster than average earnings.
The severity of these problems has diminished over the five years of the 
tax freeze, household bills having fallen in real terms relative to retail price 
inflation. However, this real reduction in tax bills has benefited households 
who would otherwise have paid the tax. The freezing of council tax has not 
benefited low-income households eligible for full Council Tax Benefit. Instead, by 
freezing council tax, the Scottish Government has been subsidising from its own 
budgets households that could not reasonably be considered to be vulnerable and 
disadvantaged. This has been done at the cost of Scotland losing money it would 
otherwise have received from the UK Exchequer in the form of extra Council Tax 
Benefit subsidy that would have been induced by increases in council tax over the 
last five years. That lost subsidy could have been used to mitigate the social risks 
being faced by vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.
However, if council tax were to be unfrozen and councils immediately 
sought to raise substantial sums of additional money by raising council 
tax bills the expansionary impact on Council Tax Benefit payments would 
almost certainly lead to capping of Benefit payments. In the years prior to 
the freeze, council tax rebate grant had risen faster than general revenue 
funding (formerly known as the revenue support grant) and the UK Labour 
Government had limited the degree to which higher council tax bills in 
Scotland could be used to lever additional social security spending in 
Scotland.
If the Scottish Government were to allow higher than assumed council 
tax bills it would have to finance the additional payments of Council Tax 
Benefit from within its own grant from the Westminster government. This 
would result in a transfer of public spending to councils from non-local 
government services such as health care. Thus, the Scottish Government has 
previously required councils to contribute towards the Council Tax Benefit 
costs of ‘excessive’ council tax increases.
Given the high gearing of council tax, it is highly likely that increases in 
bills would indeed be ‘excessive’ if councils sought to make up for cuts in 
their grants and ‘catch up’ by raising council tax bills to the levels that they 
would otherwise have been without the freeze. Hence, there would inevitably 
be a restriction on the amount of net additional finance accruing to both 
Scottish Government and councils.
Specifically, the 1997 White Paper Scotland’s Parliament (Cm 3658, 
para. 7.24) clearly states that it is open to the UK central government to 
take ‘excessive’ local authority self-financed expenditure into account in 
considering its level of support for expenditure in Scotland. ‘Excessive’ would 
be judged in terms of the growth of this category of expenditure relative to 
that in England, such as to threaten targets for public expenditure as part 
of the management of the UK economy. The UK central government would 
intervene if the Scottish Parliament failed to exercise its powers to control 
local authority current expenditure through council tax freezing, capping or 
other means.
Ironically, therefore, the council tax freeze appears to have exacerbated the 
public sector austerity in Scotland, will continue to do so even if it is abandoned, 
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and has reduced the scope of councils to mitigate austerity-induced social risks 
by offsetting reductions in their grants by increasing their rates of council tax.
Local service charges are therefore virtually the only option left to offset 
reduced grants. However, the gearing ratio for charges is very much greater 
than that for council tax. Although this does not preclude increased use of 
service charges, it severely limits their ability to raise revenue to offset losses 
of grant and emphasises that their use should be based on both ability to pay 
and need for service (see Appendix 3).
Constraints on the Scottish Government’s revenues
The Scottish Parliament has responsibility for health, education, local 
government, housing, transport, economic development, agriculture, 
social work, sport, the arts, and civil and criminal law. Those matters which 
have broader implications for the whole of the UK have been reserved to 
Westminster; these include defence and foreign policy, macroeconomic 
policy, employment legislation and border controls.
Although legislative power for devolved functions lies with the Parliament 
in Edinburgh, much of the service provision is within the remit of local 
government. In effect, the Scottish Parliament’s role is largely an extension of 
the resource allocation role performed by local government, though its powers 
have allowed it to move beyond this into a distributional role, evidenced by the 
abolition of up-front student tuition fees, the introduction of free personal care 
for the elderly and so on (see Appendix 3).
Despite the breadth of functions devolved, there has not so far been 
an equivalent devolution of financial resources. Instead, there has been a 
continuation of the arrangements prior to devolution and thus Scotland’s 
revenue from Westminster continues to be on the basis of an assigned 
budget determined by the Barnett formula (see Appendix 2).
As part of the devolution settlement, the Scottish Parliament was granted 
the power to alter (i.e. raise or reduce) the standard rate of UK personal 
income tax by up to 3 pence in the pound and thereby the right to raise 
revenues by an equivalent amount. The Calman Commission (2009) reported 
that if it had been used to the full it would have increased the Scottish 
Budget by a little over £1 billion, compared with total spending of around 
£30 billion. However, in 2010 the Scottish National Party government 
‘surrendered’ its power to levy this tax. Those ‘tartan tax’ revenues could 
otherwise have been used help manage austerity and, in particular, mitigate 
the associated social risks.
The Scotland Act 2012 introduced a new power with which the Scottish 
Parliament will be able to affect the amount of income tax to be paid by 
Scottish taxpayers and so the amount that the Scottish Government will 
have to spend. The Scottish Parliament will be able to set the rates of 
income tax lower or higher than the rates that apply in the rest of the UK 
on the basic, higher and additional rates (all three rates going up or down 
by the same percentage relative to the UK rate). However, the UK Coalition 
Government proposes that the Scottish rate will apply from April 2016 
and there is no prospect of it being used before then to raise additional tax 
revenue to help manage austerity. Whether rates of income tax rise, fall or 
stay the same as UK rates thereafter remains to be seen but by then the 
larger parts of cuts to services are scheduled to have already been made.
Put simply
•	 Believing Scotland is in a better position to cope with austerity is false.
•	 The Scottish Government can do little to offset the UK austerity 
measures.
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•	 Scottish councils face even more restricted local finances than elsewhere 
in the UK.




Transmission of austerity via the barnett formula
Rationale
The Barnett formula has been used since 1978 to recognise higher per 
capita expenditure needs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland compared 
with England. Per capita spending needs were thought to be higher in 
Scotland in the late 1970s due to its greater sparsity of population (e.g. 
leading to smaller schools and class sizes and so higher education spending 
per pupil), relative ill-health, adverse industrial structure, and lower income 
per head compared with England. Not all of these expenditure needs 
indicators apply as strongly today but it is still generally accepted that 
Scotland faces a higher need to spend per head of population than does 
England, though by how much is open to question.
What the formula does and does not do for Scotland
The Barnett formula automatically applies to Scotland a proportionate 
population share of any change in comparable English spending programmes. 
Hence, it largely determines the Scottish Government’s incremental block 
grant from central government on the basis of UK-level public expenditure 
decisions made at Westminster.
It is important to stress that the formula does not determine total public 
expenditure in Scotland or changes in it. The Barnett formula is only applied 
to devolved expenditures that are comparable with England, for example 
education, health and personal social services, housing, other environmental 
services, law and order (see Appendix 1). Devolved expenditures not 
comparable with England include water and sewerage services (privatised in 
England but not in Scotland). Non-devolved services such as social security 
payments and defence expenditures are also not subject to the formula.
In terms of public expenditure planning, the Barnett formula does not 
affect Annually Managed Expenditures (AMEs) such as social security, 
only comparable Departmental Expenditure Limits (DELs) such as school 
education. Scotland’s DELs and AMEs totals are approximately the same (i.e. 
each about half) of Total Managed Expenditures (TME). The formula applies 
to about four-fifths of Scotland’s total DELs.
Thus, the Barnett formula currently applies to less than half of public 
expenditure in Scotland. Moreover, the formula does not affect uniform 
adjustments (e.g. NHS pay awards) to all UK territories and does not affect 
exceptional and unforeseen costs (e.g. flood damage) within individual 
territories. These adjustments bypass the formula. Hence, the formula does 
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not determine total public expenditure in Scotland nor even total devolved 
expenditure or changes in those two totals.
The Barnett formula does not even determine total devolved comparable 
expenditure in Scotland. This is because the bulk of comparable devolved 
public expenditure is determined by past decisions, also financed by council 
tax, fees and charges, borrowing and so on.
Furthermore, the Barnett formula does not determine the breakdown of 
public expenditure in Scotland. The Scottish Parliament and councils decide 
what to spend on individual devolved services.
Transmission of England’s austerity to Scotland
As already noted, the Barnett formula works simply by giving to Scotland 
a fixed proportion of changes in the plans (DELs) for comparable English 
expenditure programmes. In past years of rising public expenditures the 
effect of the Barnett formula on public spending in Scotland was that it 
guaranteed Scotland a share (based on its population) of any increase in 
comparable English expenditures.
That proportion was added to the Westminster block grant for 
Scotland as the planned increases in English public spending took effect. 
The proportion received by Scotland is based on its population relative to 
England’s (currently about 10%). Hence, if a UK Government department’s 
DEL increased by £100 million and 95% of that programme is comparable 
with Scotland and Scotland’s population is 10% of England’s population, then 
the increase for Scotland is £9.5 million (i.e. £100m x 0.95 x 0.10). Hence, 
Scotland received more money per head of population than the previous 
year as England’s public spending on comparable services increased.
In particular, the previous UK Labour government’s rapid increases in 
spending (as it sought to the rectify the UK’s relatively low spending ratios 
relative to GDP for health, education and capital expenditures) benefited 
Scotland through application of the Barnett formula to calculation of the 
block grant paid to it by the Westminster government.
However, as noted above, the Barnett formula applies to changes (i.e. 
both increases and decreases) in spending in England and so it now works in 
reverse to reduce the block grant paid to the Scottish Government by the 
Westminster government as the latter cuts comparable spending in England. 
Hence, during the current era of public sector austerity, the Barnett formula 
has become the means by which austerity is transmitted to the UK territorial 
governments – Northern Ireland and Wales as well as Scotland.
Put simply
The Barnett formula:
•	 applies to less than half of public expenditure in Scotland;
•	 only determines changes in that part of expenditure from year to year;
•	  does not apply to social security payments;
•	 does not determine the breakdown of devolved spending;
•	 transmits austerity to Scotland;
•	 does not protect Scotland from the UK austerity.
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aPPEndix 3
austerity under localism, devolution and independence
All three major UK parties have proposed the end of the highly centralist 
state, all claiming to be advocates of true devolution of public services. All 
three propose further devolution of power but the precise meaning and 
extent of devolution and localism varies between the parties.
What all three UK parties do agree on is a greater role for the private 
sector as well as greater scope for choice by service users (e.g. for health 
and education services). All three plus the Scottish National Party propose 
or support development of forms of not-for-profit trusts, mutuals and social 
enterprises to provide public services, now generally now referred to as the 
‘Big Society’.
Localism
Localism refers to introduction of a new ‘constrained discretion’ model of 
policy-making. There is a cross-party consensus in favour of localism, the 
general aim being to make public service delivery more effective by allowing 
public service managers more discretion and implementing much greater 
devolution of power to the local level.
The UK Coalition Government’s intention is to further develop this 
model to encompass local government in England to encourage flexibility, 
responsiveness and creativity to meet service user needs and demands 
during the current public sector austerity. This greater devolution in the 
form of localism is to be matched by clear long-term goals and strong 
accountability. Constrained discretion means that localism provides no easy 
route out of austerity via a spending splurge.
The UK political parties’ proposals for financing local government within 
this new localism differ quite radically. The UK Liberal Democrats is the 
only party to favour a true local income tax. It would make local authorities 
responsible for raising the majority of their own income and would be more 
closely related to ability to pay than council tax. However, it would not 
necessarily result in additional money for public services because it would 
reduce (but not eliminate completely) the need for payment of equalisation 
grants to local governments and would almost certainly be subject to central 
government capping via a maximum allowable rate of tax consistent with 
macroeconomic policy. Indeed, all three political parties accept the argument 
for consolidation of the public finances.
Additionally, although a local income tax takes account of ability to pay 
it may not necessarily do more than Council Tax Benefit to relieve financial 
pressure on low-income groups and it cannot help target service benefits 
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on disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Hence, introducing a local income 
tax to replace or reduce the financial burden on council tax is not a solution 
to local austerity, not a means of mitigating social risk and may do little to 
reduce gearing (see Appendix 1).
Although also being in support of a version of localism, the Conservatives 
proposed a reduction of local authority service responsibilities and tax cuts, 
the latter now being regarded as not feasible for the foreseeable future. They 
pledge ultimately to cut taxes on people and businesses while maintaining 
the levels and standards of public services. This they plan to achieve by 
reducing inefficiency in service provision, by reducing wasteful use of public 
finance and by using the extra tax revenues generated by the economic 
growth that they hope will arise spontaneously as reduction of the public 
sector creates room for the private sector to expand by reducing ‘crowding 
out’.
The previous UK Labour government sought to increase localism in 
England by removing reserved council tax capping powers for councils 
assessed as ‘high performers’. Councils were also given greater discretion as 
to how much they can prudently borrow utilising the Prudential Borrowing 
Framework (Bailey et al., 2009, 2010, 2012; Bailey and Asenova, 2011) and 
legislation introduced in 2003 allows greater local discretion in charging for 
services (Bailey, 2010). Both powers have also been introduced in Scotland.
Notwithstanding such laudable intentions to increase localism, in practice 
councils are becoming ever more dependent on intergovernmental transfers 
in being subject to capping (in England) and freezing (in Scotland) of their 
council tax rates over extended periods of time (see Appendix 1).
Devolution
The Scottish Parliament has extensive legislative powers for services but 
is not so well endowed in terms of financial autonomy in their funding. 
Provision of most services is within the remit of local government. Hence, 
the Scottish Government could be seen as little more than a financial 
intermediary through which grants are channelled from the UK central 
government to the Scottish public sector. However, it has recently sought 
to influence the spending allocations of Scottish councils through the 
Concordat and its payments of grants based thereupon.
Relatively recent decisions of the Scottish Parliament to scrap some 
charges have arguably reduced its capacity to manage the UK austerity 
measures because these decisions have increased demands on services while 
reducing their incomes. First, the abolition of up-front university tuition 
fees led to increased take-up of university places. Second, the abolition of 
charges for personal care of frail older people led to increased take-up of 
care services. Third, free bus travel for all senior citizens and disabled card 
holders led to increases in travel by these two groups and, consequently, in 
the subsidy that the Scottish Government pays.
The financial implications of abolition of charges in Scotland but not in 
England are not allowed for in the Scottish Government’s block grant paid by 
the Westminster government because Scottish spending decisions are not 
funded via the Barnett formula (see Appendix 2).
As is the case for the freezing of council tax (see Appendix 1), the groups 
benefiting disproportionately from making these services free were not 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups because the latter’s use of these 
services is disproportionately low (e.g. universities) or they already received 
financial support (e.g. personal care). The picture for free bus travel is more 
mixed but people aged 60 and over qualify notwithstanding the fact that 
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many are still in employment (and so can travel to work by bus for free) and 
by no means all pensioners are poor (e.g. those with occupational pensions).
Scottish local authorities claimed that the Scottish Government’s 
decisions to increase the range of free services were not properly ‘costed’, 
especially free personal care. These free public services therefore increase 
the pressure on both the Scottish Government and local authorities to 
achieve cost savings in other devolved services. The result is that there is less 
financial flexibility for the public finances to be used to mitigate the social 
risks faced by disadvantaged and vulnerable groups as a result of the UK 
austerity measures,
Hence, the universal nature of these free services does little or nothing 
to mitigate the social risks of austerity and may even increase them by 
diverting scarce funds from services of particular benefit to vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups.
Local authorities retain powers to levy charges and need to develop 
corporate policies for their use, considering how they may promote Best 
Value during this era of austerity. Service charges are very underdeveloped in 
this respect but well developed socially responsive charging methodologies 
exist (Bailey, 2010). Although it has to be recognised that they are subject to 
a much higher gearing ratio than council tax (see Appendix 1), in combination 
with service vouchers, charges could be used to mitigate austerity-induced 
social risks by taking account of both ability to pay and need for service 
(Elliott et al., 2010; Valkama et al., 2010).
Charges should not be used primarily to raise additional revenue but, 
instead, to focus the benefits of free and partially subsidised services on 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. The better targeting of support via 
such socially progressive charges would be more effective in mitigating 
austerity-induced social risks than any extra revenues they raise.
Independence
The Scottish National Party claims that an independent Scotland would be 
financially better off and so less subject to austerity. It argues that Scotland 
raises more in taxes than is shown in general government accounts, the main 
area of disagreement being over the division between Scotland and England 
of tax revenues from North Sea oil and gas operations.
However, even if division of those tax revenues is redrawn to favour 
Scotland’s accounts, a future fall in their amount could result in an 
independent Scotland facing a potentially severe budget deficit which it 
may not be possible to finance by borrowing. This would be the case if an 
independent Scotland was subject to the EU’s Fiscal Compact which requires 
public sector debt to be reduced. In that case, Scotland’s public spending 
would have to be cut, perhaps by even more than the UK Government 
requires.
Even if the Scottish National Party is right about the potential 
contribution of Scotland’s oil and gas tax revenues to a future Scottish 
exchequer, there may not be significantly more money for public services 
in an independent Scotland because the Westminster block grant would 
be scrapped. In fact, independence would require Scotland to pay England 
sufficient money to cover its share of defence, foreign policy and other UK-
level functions of government. Depending on the relative levels of those 
amounts, independence could conceivably reverse the current net flow of 
funds from England to Scotland.
With independence, all taxes would be set and collected by the Scottish 
Government and so it could choose to increase taxes to avoid the need for 
cuts in public spending. How likely this would be is open to question because 
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the ‘tartan tax’ powers to vary the rate of income tax were never used (see 
Appendix 1). Moreover, there may be an element of tax competition between 
England and Scotland, each country restraining (if not competitively cutting) 
the levels of taxes it imposes on geographically mobile business and labour. 
Such harmonisation is already the case for the business property tax.
Loss of footloose people and businesses could be reduced if higher taxes 
on them were used to improve the quantity and quality of public services 
they receive. However, this would limit the extent to which any extra tax 
revenues were used to finance mitigation of the austerity-induced social 
risks faced by disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
These constraints would put an emphasis on engineering high rates of 
economic growth to increase tax bases (rather than tax rates) so that rising 
tax revenues are available to finance improved public services. However, 
economic growth will be difficult to achieve as long as there is depressed 
demand for Scotland’s exports caused by low-to-zero economic growth 
among its main trading partners, including England.
Put simply
•	 localism provides no easy route out of austerity;
•	 devolution has not made dealing with austerity any easier;
•	 this will remain the case irrespective of greater devolution or outright 
independence;
•	 reducing austerity seems only possible through high economic growth;
•	 but councils could make much better use of service charges to mitigate 
social risks;
•	 charges should be moderated by vouchers based on both ability to pay 
and need for service;
•	 so the Scottish public sector is stuck with austerity but could mitigate the 
social risks;
•	 the same charging powers exist elsewhere in the UK.
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